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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

STRUCTURES, ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN PUBLIC HEALTH’S
RESPONSE TO THE 2009-2010 H1N1 OUTBREAK:
THE TIES THAT BIND PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS AND
EMERGENCY RISK COMMUNICATION EFFORTS

Little is known about the role of public health public information officers (PIOs)
during public health emergencies. This study uses interpretative methods to learn about
the organizational structures that facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication
efforts during public health emergencies. Interpretive thematic comparative analysis of
PIOs experiences and reflections about their involvement in the 2009-2010 H1N1 response
will be used to illustrate how social interactions between and among PIOs, public health
staff, and representatives from other agencies create implicit and explicit structures that
facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication. The application of three specific
concepts from structuration theory, namely, agent, duality of structure and
institutionalized processes will be key in the exploration of the role of the PIO within the
context of emergency planning and response.
Participants in this study were individuals from Kentucky, North Dakota, New
Jersey and California who served as a PIO during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic
influenza response. The study’s findings suggest that social interactions between
organizational members, in addition to the organization of public health systems in each
state, contribute to the similarities and differences in the enactment of the PIO role.
Further, this study also suggests that the permeability of emergency response plans,
another type of organizational structure, facilitate and constrain PIOs’ emergency risk
communication efforts. Finally, this study also suggests that the involvement of PIOs in
emergency planning and exercises impacts the types of relationships that are created and
maintained before and during emergency responses.
KEYWORDS: Public Information Officers, Emergency Communication,
Risk Communication, Public Health
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Chapter One: Introduction
For most of the 21st century, society has faced several man-made and natural
disasters that have required federal, state and local government agencies to engage in
emergency risk communication practices. Each instance, whether it was a terrorist attack
or a natural disaster, required the responding agency to demonstrate specific
communication competencies such as informing various publics about what happened,
what was being done to minimize harm and how individuals could protect themselves
from injury. These specific communication competencies fall under the category of
emergency risk communication, which is defined as providing “information to allow an
individual, stakeholder, or an entire community to make the best possible decisions about
their well-being within nearly impossible time constraints and help people ultimately to
accept the imperfect nature of choices during the crisis” (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [CDC], 2002, p. 6). Unfortunately, some federal government agencies have
not established a strong track record for demonstrating such emergency risk
communication competence. Further, even less is known about the emergency risk
communication competencies of state and local government agencies—in particular
public health agencies and public information officers (PIOs). The label PIO comes from
enacting the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management
Systems (NIMS) during an emergency response; further, the federal government defines
a PIO as an individual who supports the Incident Commander and disseminates accurate
information to various stakeholders in a timely fashion (CDC, 2006; DHS, 2007; DHS,
2008). Depending on the breadth of the emergency, multiple PIOs from various
government levels and entities may be expected to join together in crafting multiple
1

responses (CDC, 2006). To ensure information sharing and message fidelity among other
response agencies, PIOs are encouraged to use the Joint Information System (JIS), which
is a system for developing and delivering coordinated interagency messages; executing
public information plans and strategies; and advising the Incident Commander and
controlling rumors and inaccurate information (DHS, 2007, p. 7).
While there are experts in emergency planning and emergency management, the
primary role of coordinating internal communication and disseminating emergency risk
messages during emergencies often rests with the government communicator or PIO, and
unfortunately, little is known about PIOs and their role in emergency planning and
subsequent emergency response activities. This dissertation study explores the role of a
public health PIO in an emergency context by investigating the enactment of the PIO
role, internal communication activities, and relationships with both public health staff and
external agencies. Further, since public health departments are required by federal
preparedness funds to use the ICS and the National Incident Management NIMS—a new
condition set in place by then-President George W. Bush—these organizational structures
could constrain or enable PIOs emergency risk communication efforts.
There is documented evidence that the federal government has conducted
numerous simulations and exercises to test and practice emergency response plans and
procedures, but emergency risk communication continues to fall short. In fact, despite
these numerous efforts to test emergency response plans and emergency risk
communication procedures, the United States government failed to provide effective
emergency risk communication during Hurricane Katrina. The United States House of
Representatives released the report “A Failure of Initiative—Final Report of the Select
2

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina” (General Printing Office [GPO], 2006) that reveal a lack of information sharing
during the emergency response.
This lack of communication and information sharing across government agencies
was also reported in several exercise evaluations in multiple government emergency
response exercises and drills in 2000, 2003, and 2005 (DHS, 2003; DHS, 2006; George,
2007; Hoffman & Norton, 2000; McNally, 2007; Office of Inspector General, 2009;
TOPOFF 1, n.d.; TOPOFF 2, n.d.; TOPOFF 3, n.d.). If government agencies are not
sharing information across organizational boundaries, emergency risk communication
efforts will be hampered. This negative impact on emergency risk communication efforts
was also seen in the 2000 Top Officials (TOPOFF) national emergency exercise.
In May 2000, TOPOFF was conducted to test local, state and federal emergency
response plans and procedures; the event was co-sponsored by the Department of Justine
(DOJ) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (George, 2007; Hoffman &
Norton, 2000; NRT, 2001; DHS, 2003; McNally, 2007; Office of Inspections, 2005).
From the exercise evaluation report, three recommendations were made regarding public
information and risk communication efforts. First, the evaluation suggests agencies
develop Joint Information Centers (JICs), which help coordinate information sharing
between agencies involved during the response. Second, the evaluation suggests
improving public information message coordination at the federal level. This
recommendation is based on mock press release that was distributed during the exercise
with incorrect information; disseminating inaccurate information does not demonstrate
emergency risk communication competence. The third recommendation suggests specific
3

assessment of information flows from Joint Information Centers to the Joint Operations
Center (NRT, 2001). Each of these recommendations directly impacts the role of a PIO
and, unfortunately, this exercise revealed many deficiencies with public information
efforts during an emergency response. These deficiencies are solely focused on internal
communication activities, and highlight a lack of communication between the PIO and
other emergency response personnel.
Three years later, government agencies would be given an opportunity to
demonstrate what they had learned from the first exercise. TOPOFF 2, held in 2003,
placed more emphasis on the role of public health agencies in a national emergency
response (DHS, 2003; NRT, 2001; TOPOFF 1, n.d.). Unfortunately, TOPOFF 2 revealed
two more concerns about public information and risk communication efforts. First, the
exercise evaluation report highlighted the vital importance of developing and
disseminating a consistent message from incident command, public health, and medical
communities (DHS, 2003, p. 7). The evaluation report from the first TOPOFF exercise
suggested that government agencies develop Joint Information Centers (JICs) to ensure
that all PIOs were privy to information sharing and could develop consistent messages to
disseminate; however, the TOPOFF 2 evaluation report suggests that internal
communication efforts were not streamlined to establish a JIC and, therefore, resulted in
yet another failure of emergency risk communication competence. “TOPOFF 2 showed
that how people believe communications and coordination is supposed to work based on
policy is often not how they work in reality” (TOPOFF 2, n.d., p. 9). To ensure that
public health and emergency response staff share information, they need to have a better
understanding of what structures and systems should be enacted during an emergency
4

response. In order to have a better understanding of what to do during an emergency
response, there ought to be more testing of communication plans and procedures for
communication staff; often exercises and drills fail to test and analyze public information
efforts. The evaluation report also suggests that an emergency response team of public
and professional communications ought to be included in emergency response procedures
(Hoffman & Norton, 2000). Developing an emergency risk communication team, is
essential for most emergency responses and is often established when ICS and NIMS is
properly initiated by the lead response agency.
Two years later, government officials had yet another opportunity to demonstrate
how emergency risk communication and public information efforts had improved since
the previous exercise. TOPOFF 3 took placed in April 2005 with the scenario focused on
biological and chemical weapon attacks in the Eastern United States (Office of
Inspections, 2005; TOPOFF 3, n.d.). Public information was one of four critical areas
assessed during the exercise and specifically focused on the coordination of emergency
risk communication between three international governments: the U.S., the United
Kingdom and Canada. While the evaluation report provided an overview of how
emergency risk communication was used during the exercise, it did not provide any
assessment of whether the emergency risk communication was effective or ineffective
nor did it offer any recommendations for improvement. Since the report did not include
any reference to Joint Information Centers or a direct assessment of communication
efforts, it is impossible to know definitively what worked or what did not in the exercise.
The lack of assessment of communication efforts in a national exercise provides further
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evidence that a study on the role of PIOs is warranted, and it further highlights how little
is actually known about the role of PIOs during emergency responses.
Again, two years later, government officials had another opportunity to improve
emergency risk communication efforts. TOPOFF 4 held in October 2007 focused on
mass decontamination activities and long-term recovery. Emergency risk communication
efforts were focused on coordinating with international partners, testing new
communication policies and procedures, and creating messages for vulnerable
populations, including limited English proficiency individuals (McNally, 2007; Suburban
Emergency Management Project, 2009). The exercise evaluation report highlighted three
shortcomings with emergency risk communication. First, “PIOs at all levels of
government had difficulty obtaining substantive information on response activities”
(McNally, 2007, p. 8). This emergency risk communication failure highlights a lack of
internal communication among public affairs staff and their emergency response
coworkers. Internal communication and collaboration with key staff are essential to
ensure effective emergency risk communication occurs.
The evaluation report suggested that PIOs and emergency planners should
“review emergency plans to ensure they adequately address information sharing”
between response and public affairs personnel (McNally, 2007, p. 9). This issue
highlights the second major issue about the limited knowledge about the PIOs and their
collaboration with emergency planning and response coworkers. As the evaluation
reports suggests, this issue of collaboration exists at all levels of government: federal,
state and local. This dissertation analyzes the relationships PIOs have with both internal
public staff, but also external agencies. The exercise evaluation report reveals a third
6

issue with emergency risk communication: the messages did not provide adequate
justification or reveal benefits as to why the public should engage in protective action
recommendations (McNally, 2007). This third issue demonstrates how a lack of internal
communication and collaboration among emergency response staff can impact the
emergency risk communication messages that disseminated are to the public.
In an effort to improve emergency preparedness and response activities and,
subsequently, internal communication and collaboration, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was signed into law by President George W. Bush in
December 2006 (Hodge, Gostin & Vernick, 2007). “The objective of emergency
preparedness is to improve the nation’s ability to detect and respond to an array of public
health emergencies included bioterrorism, emerging infectious diseases and natural
disasters” (Hodge et. al, 2007, p. 1708). The PAHPA Act ensured that health departments
across the United States would be trained to know specific emergency preparedness and
response policies and procedures. However, little is known about any requirements
related to emergency risk communication competencies for public health PIOs.
Since 2001 American taxpayers have been responsible for funding public health
preparedness efforts, (CDC; 2002; GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009; Katz, Staiti, & McKenzie,
2006; Lister, 2007b) and, as such, public health agencies should be held accountable for
their ability to engage in effective risk communication procedures during public health
emergencies. Effective risk communication enhances decision-making processes by those
bearing the risk (Palenchar & Heath, 2002), while ineffective risk communication fails to
account for public concern or solicit feedback from the risk bearers (Sellnow, Ulmer,
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Seeger & Littlefield, 2009). Further, emergency risk communication plays a vital role in
an emergency response (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003).
Risk communication is often considered a process or dialogue of sharing available
information and knowledge regarding threats to human health and safety (Heath,
McKinney & Palenchar, 2005; Heath & O’Hair, 2009; Heath, 2010; National Research
Council, 1989; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003). Risk communication is also focused on
future events (Seeger et al., 2003) and is often operationalized in health communication
campaigns (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Seeger & Reynolds, 2008; Veil, Reynolds,
Sellnow & Seeger, 2008). In addition to risk and crisis communication, the CDC
developed a new term: crisis and emergency risk communication. This new hybrid term
continues to emphasize crisis demands and communication exigencies, but also
incorporates precrisis stages of risk and risk development (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005;
Seeger & Reynolds, 2008). Throughout the rest of this document, the broader language
of emergency risk communication will be used for consistency in order to describe
communication strategies enacted by emergency response and public affairs personnel
during emergency preparedness and response activities.
As illustrated in each of the TOPOFF exercises, consistent emergency risk
communication failures continue to occur despite continued testing of plans.
Unfortunately, these errors—if not properly analyzed and corrected—will impact real life
emergency responses. Hurricane Katrina certainly provides evidence to suggest massive
emergency risk communication failures occurred; however, public health was not
designated as the lead response agency for that emergency response. It would not be until
2009 that public health agencies and public health PIOs across the United States would
8

have to demonstrate emergency risk communication competence to respond to a
worldwide pandemic. The 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak provides risk communication
scholars a rich scenario, which can be studied to better understand emergency risk
communication. By June 2009, the World Health Organization classified the H1N1
outbreak as the first pandemic of the 21st century (Lynn, 2009). Since the last pandemic
that affected the United States occurred in 1968, there have been major advances in
medicine, mass media technology, and risk communication research. Specifically in the
area of risk communication research, CDC has taken the lead in developing sophisticated
emergency risk communication policies and procedures. After the anthrax attacks of
2001, CDC communication practitioners developed the Crisis and Emergency Risk
Communication (CERC) training manual (CDC, 2002; Seeger & Reynolds, 2008;
Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Veil et al., 2008), and since 2008, over 100,000 public health
professionals have been trained in CERC (Seeger & Reynolds, 2008). However, little
evaluation research has been done on whether CERC positively or negatively impacts
emergency risk communication. In 2005, the CDC sponsored regional CERC training
seminars to inform public health officials about responding to a pandemic influenza using
emergency risk communication strategies. In the event pharmaceuticals, such as vaccine
and antivirals, were not available to mitigate the spread of the new influenza strain, nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as hand-washing, and emergency risk communication
were be the main line of defense in combating an influenza pandemic (CDC, 2002).
The timing of the CDC training seminars was crucial: Dr. Julie Gerberding, thenCDC Director, testified before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee
Health Committee on Energy and Commerce about looming threat of a global pandemic.
9

She cited epidemiological evidence to alert government officials to a potentially
dangerous avian influenza virus (H5N1). The H5N1 strain had two of the three criteria
needed to cause a pandemic: there was no preexisting immunity in the human population
and it caused illnesses in humans. Fortunately, sustained human-to-human transmission,
the third factor for an influenza pandemic, had not yet emerged (Reynolds & Quinn,
2008).
Since 1997, public health officials had been engaged in active surveillance of
avian influenza viruses that were responsible for killing millions of domestic fowl in
Southeast Asia (Fauci, 2006; Lister, 2007a). The primary concern of epidemiologists was
not the culling of the animals, but rather the human-to-human transmissions in several
Asian and European counties (Fauci, 2006). Of the 250 individuals infected by the avian
influenza virus 150 died, resulting in a 60% mortality rate (Lister, 2007a). Public health
officials began raising concerns about potential threat of morbidity and mortality related
to an influenza pandemic. Director of the National Institutes of Allergies and Infectious
Diseases, Dr. Anthony Fauci, offered the following perspective: “We cannot be certain
when the next influenza pandemic will emerge, or even whether it will be caused by
H5N1 or an unrelated virus. However, we can be certain that an influenza pandemic
eventually will occur” (2006, p. 1). Historically, pandemic influenzas have been linked to
high numbers of illnesses and even death. Three major influenza pandemics erupted in
the past century: the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918 caused 50 million deaths worldwide;
the 1957 Asian flu caused 1-2 million deaths worldwide; and the 1968 Hong Kong Flu
caused 700,000 deaths worldwide (CDC, 2006; HHS, 2005).
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The threat of a global pandemic lead the United States Congress, for FY2002 and
subsequent years, to provide specific funding for pandemic influenza preparedness
through both regular and emergency supplemental appropriations (CDC, 2002; GAO,
2008; GAO, 2009; Lister, 2007a; Lister, 2007b). The first round of funding focused on
vaccine production, but then Congress required the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) to use the funding for state and local public health capacity, CDC
capacity, CDC domestic and global surveillance, DHHS international activities, vaccine
development and stockpiling of other antivirals (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009; Katz et al.,
2006; Lister, 2007a).
In an effort to build state and local pandemic preparedness capacity in the area of
risk communication, CDC sponsored the regional two-day CERC training sessions. The
training sessions provided attendees with an overview of risk communication, how to
establish a JIC and various strategies for communicating during a public health
emergency. Each training session also included a tabletop exercise, which focused on an
influenza virus emerging from Mexico and quickly spreading across the United States.
At that time, it was unknown that the 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic would even
emerge—let alone that it would originate in Mexico or it be a quadruple-reassortant virus
resulting from swine, avian, and human influenza viruses (Nuemann, Noda, & Kawaoka,
2009; “The 2009 H1N1,” 2010).
During the H1N1 outbreak, from April 2009 through approximately June 2010,
local public health departments used local resources and national stockpiles to respond to
the global pandemic the U.S. had been preparing for since 2005. Drawing upon the CDC
training seminars, previous experience, and emergency operation plans, public health
11

officials enacted emergency response procedures to combat the pandemic. Many of the
emergency response procedures focused on mass vaccinations, distribution of antivirals,
use of non-pharmaceutical methods, and risk communication (CDC, 2002). “Vaccination
is considered the best preventative measure for influenza” (Lister, 2007a, p. 12). Despite
CDC’s announcement that vaccines would be available in October 2009, vaccine
production was delayed.
As a result, health departments utilized the Strategic National Stockpile to obtain
antivirals and disseminated information about non-pharmaceutical methods to protect
individuals from illness (Trust for America’s Health, 2009). Emergency risk
communication was a vital component in educating the public about the virus, nonpharmaceutical methods, and vaccine production (CDC, 2002). “The HHS Pandemic
Plan notes that effective risk communication during a pandemic, among other things, help
set realistic public expectations of the healthcare system, and promptly address rumors,
inaccuracies, and misperceptions” (Lister, 2007b, p. 17-18). However, little is known
about how local public health PIOs enacted the functional role of a PIO in an emergency
response and if internal organizational structures impacted these emergency responses.
In the current study, structuration theory will be used to analyze how individuals enact
the role of a PIO as they collaborate with public health staff and external agencies.
Interpretive thematic comparative analysis of PIOs richly textured experiences and
reflections about those experiences will be used to illustrate how social interactions

between and among PIOs, public health staff, and representatives from other agencies
create social structures that facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication.
Structuration theory has been applied in multiple organizational contexts analyzing
12

agency, ideology and group decision making (Banks & Riley, 1993; Bastein, McPhee &
Bolton, 1995; Garner, 2006; McPhee & Seibold, 1985; Nicotera, 2008; Poole, McPhee &
Seibold, 1982; Witmer, 1997), but it has yet to be used in the area of risk and crisis
communication research. The application of three specific concepts from structuration
theory, namely, agent, duality of structure and institutionalized processes will be key in
the exploration of the role of the PIO within the context of emergency planning and
response.
For example, the element of agent will be used to understand how the setting and
expected modes of conduct impact how a PIO (as an organizational member) enacts
particular roles. Similarly, duality of structure, a major tenet of structuration theory, will
be used to highlight how the production and reproduction of structures create both the
medium and the outcome of communication actions among PIOs. In particular, the
current dissertation seeks to apply the concept of duality of structure to analyze how the
creation of emergency response plans facilitated and constrained emergency risk
communication efforts during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Similarly, the concept of
institutionalized processes will be used to provide insights about how working
relationships form both within health departments as well as across external agencies.
Finally, the concept of boundary spanning will be used to enhance the analysis of
institutionalized processes by revealing how communication officers interact with
external agencies and how such interaction impacts external communication efforts.
Health communication research on public information officers and H1N1 has
primarily focused on how PIOs use press releases to frame messages (Avery & Kim,
2009; Avery, Lariscy & Sohn, 2009); however, little is known how the internal
13

communication and collaboration among public health staff impact how PIOs
disseminate emergency risk communication messages to the public. Second, because of
the limited research related to PIOs and their role in emergencies, this dissertation has the
potential to be at the forefront of an emerging research area that has the potential to
improve the risk communication competencies of PIOs and internal collaborations with
public health staff during emergencies. As society continues to face man-made and
natural disasters, government agencies and other emergency response organizations must
be confident that the PIOs will competently engage the public through efficient
emergency risk communication practices that will effectively reduce harm and injury to
those affected by the emergency.
This chapter provided an overview of the dissertation and provided evidence to
justify a study on public information officers in an emergency context. The next chapter
highlights relevant literature on PIOs, boundary spanners, and organization structures. It
provides an overview of structuration theory, the theoretical framework for this study.
The literature review concludes with the dissertation research questions.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of relevant risk communication
literature pertinent to the current dissertation and is organized in three major sections.
The first section defines the key terms in order to provide the reader with a clear
conceptual understanding of the information referenced throughout this dissertation. For
example, the terms “risk communication,” “crisis communication” and “crisis and
emergency risk communication” are defined because they are often used incorrectly,
without appropriate distinctions among the concepts. The second section provides
literature related to current studies of PIOs that provides a foundation for understanding
the enactment of those roles in order to create emergency risk communication strategies
and disseminate vital information to the public. Section three provides an overview of
structuration theory as the primary framework for exploring the role of a public health
PIO in an emergency context by examining the enactment of the PIO role, internal
communication activities, and relationships with both public health staff and external
agencies.
In particular, research is reviewed that explains how PIOs create and function
within organizational structures (such as ICS and NIMS) and ultimately how these
structures impact emergency risk communication efforts. In addition, research is
reviewed to illustrate how the enactment of PIO roles may differ across multiple states,
and to what extent social structures impact internal and external relationships. Relevant
literature on boundary spanners is also included in an attempt to inform the analysis of
PIO interaction with external stakeholders.
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The literature review concludes with specific research questions that are used to
frame the application of structuration theory and boundary spanning to explore the
critical role of PIOs operating within an emergency context.
Risk communication
The field of risk communication is said to have developed in the early 1980’s
after the American public became fed up with the lack of information regarding certain
risks including nuclear power (Sandman, 1993). The public called for policymakers and
private industry to start a dialogue and share information about potential risks to society’s
health and safety. By engaging in a dialogue, those with fears about the risks “can
become more knowledgeable and confident that sufficient control is imposed by the
sources of risk and by government or external sources that are responsible for monitoring
risk generators” (Palenchar, 2009, p. 35).
In addition to risks, crises are characterized by Heath and O’Hair (2009) in the
following way: crises are risks manifested. In addition to risk communication, there is
also crisis communication, which is defined as “the collection and processing of
information for crisis team decision-making along with the creation and dissemination of
crisis messages to people outside the team” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Crisis communication
is often event-specific and message content is usually created quickly and based upon
incomplete informational inputs (Seeger et al., 2003). A crisis is described as “a specific,
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based-event or series of events which
creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high
priority goals” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 7).
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In addition risk communication and crisis communication, CDC developed the
hybrid term “crisis and emergency risk communication” (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005, p.
49). The hybrid term created a more refined conception of what it means to communicate
during a public health emergency. “Crisis and emergency risk communication is the
effort by experts to provide information to allow an individual, a stakeholder, or an entire
community to make the best possible decisions about their well-being during a crisis”
(CDC, 2002, p. 6). With a conceptual understanding of risk, crisis, and emergency
communication, it is important to review the current state of research related to
government public information officers.
Public information officers
This section explores what is known about public information officers (PIOs) and
serves to highlight the inherent problems related to the lack of information available
about PIOs during emergency preparedness and response activities. Although several
federal exercises (DHS, 2003; DHS, 2006; George, 2007; Hoffman & Norton, 2000;
McNally, 2007; Office of Inspector General, 2009; TOPOFF 1, n.d.; TOPOFF 2, n.d.;
TOPOFF 3, n.d.) have analyzed the process of emergency risk communication, very little
systematic research has been completed to evaluate how emergency risk communication
principles are enacted by PIOs before and during an emergency. In fact, Wise’s (2001)
call for more research on public information officers (especially research that explores
several topical areas including roles and models, effectiveness, relational research, crisis
related case studies, issues management, and technology) has largely gone unanswered.
Investigating health PIOs and their ability to enact emergency responses to a pandemic
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influenza, provide an important first step in answering Wise’s call to provide systematic
research about the roles and models in health departments and crisis related case studies.
Previous research has focused on the functions of PIOs (Avery & Kim, 2009; Avery et
al., 2009; Andsager & Smiley, 1998; Stein, 2006; Dunwoody & Ryan, 1983; Telg &
Raulerson, 1999).
Three studies highlighted the PIOs role in constructing key messages and framing
information for different emergency contexts. Avery and Kim (2009) analyzed
government press releases related to the threat of pandemic influenza. They discovered
that PIOs induced uncertainty about a pandemic influenza by including certain types of
information that was more likely to induce fear. In an effort to reduce uncertainty, Avery
and Kim suggest communication practitioners strike a balance between creating
uncertainty and reducing it when constructing key messages for press releases. Further,
while government agency press releases included evidence of interorganizational
communication, they frequently failed to provide additional information about who the
public should contact for more information (Avery & Kim, 2009).
In a similar study conducted by Andsager and Smiley (1998), press releases from
the Dow Corning silicone implant controversy also provided evidence as to how PIO’s
use particular frames to create messages. Taken together, these studies highlight how
PIOs gather, coordinate and disseminate risk communication messages. Unfortunately,
these studies do not provide meaningful information about the impact of organizational
structures on communication practitioners. This study seeks to provide new and
meaningful knowledge about the impact of organizational structures on public
information officers producing emergency risk communication. In addition, because PIOs
18

serve as mediators between organizational members and the media, it is critical to
understand how internal communication processes and collaboration among work
colleagues. While two specific research studies revealed that fellow colleagues often
undervalue PIOs, there was a disappointing lack of analysis about how organizational
structures may have created this incongruent situation (Ankey & Curtin, 2002;
Dunwoody & Ryan, 1985).
Despite their vital functions, limited research has focused on the role of PIOs
during emergency responses. Instead, as previously highlighted, research on PIOs has
focused on the public relations or the technical activities carried out by communication
practitioners on a daily basis. PIOs who serve in an emergency must frequently assume
additional substantive roles that extend beyond simple routine public relations activities.
One case study highlighted the Thurston High School shootings and how PIOs evaluated
their efficiency after the event (Stein, 2006). This study showcased how the lack of
emergency preparation and coordination led to organic and emergent forms of an
emergency response. For example, up to 13 PIOs from across the community appeared
on scene to assist with the response and helped coordinate press conferences, handle
media inquiries and facilitate communication between affected families and the media.
Four lessons emerged from this crisis event. First, it is critical to designate an individual
to monitor the media. Monitoring the media provides PIOs with situational awareness
about the evolving crisis event. Additionally, if misinformation or rumors are being
reported, the PIO will be able to provide accurate information and bolster the credibility
of his/her organization. Second, organizational websites were important as conduits to
disseminate information. Third, it is important to maintain personal health during the
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response. Finally, it is vital to equip PIOs with the necessary information to meet the
information needs of several different stakeholders. While these individuals learned from
their experiences, CDC’s CERC training materials (2002) were modified to include
specific information for communication practitioners about monitoring the media, using
multiple channels to disseminate messages, maintaining relationships with multiple
stakeholders, and dealing with the stress of an emergency event. This study highlights the
lack of emergency risk communication competence by those tasked with handling
communication activities during emergencies.
Through observation of two emergency response exercises, researchers (Militello,
Patterson, Bowman & Wears, 2006) revealed three major factors that contributed to the
lack of coordination among emergency operations center (EOC) staff. First, lack of
experience and familiarity with response tools and procedures can inhibit the flow of
information among staff. Second, verbal utterances were often distorted leading to
dissemination of misinformation. Third, an uneven workload and disrupted
communication negatively impacted the information flow among staff. While the studies
highlighted staff working on emergency response efforts and highlighted competence of
emergency response tools and procedures, the researchers did not focus on the role of the
PIO in the EOC. While this research provides important emergency preparedness and
response information, it fails to provide any significant knowledge about how
communication officers could or should be included in the EOC.
Despite federal regulations to train and comply with ICS and NIMS, which
requires the PIO position to be filled during an emergency response, small government
agencies do not have funding available to hire a full-time PIO. In a needs-assessment of
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fire department PIOs in a small community in Florida, 12 of 26 had a PIO on staff; with 9
PIOs in full time positions (Westbrook, 1999). In the departments that did not have a
PIO, individuals from other agencies often provided communication assistance as needed.
Surette (2001) investigated the increase of civilian PIOs in criminal justice agencies
expanding previous research (Surette, 1995) on the gatekeeping role of PIOs in crime
news. Motschall and Cao (2002) reported that police PIOs perform traditional public
relations functions, but allows law enforcement agencies to “engage in more frequent and
effective communications with external audiences such as the media and the general
community” (p. 177).
While many of aforementioned studies have focused on PIOs in fire departments
or emergency management agencies, other studies included a brief mention of the role of
public health PIOs, but did not explicitly analyze what PIOs did during the emergency
response. Novak and Barrett (2008) examine the roles of spokespersons during the
CDC’s response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, but do not extend the investigation to
include the role PIOs played in the response. Ulmer, Avery and Kordsmeier (2008)
explore communication practices PIOs used in managing the West Nile virus, but again
they did not analyze how organizational structures could impact those communication
practices.
While the previous section focused on general and current research on PIOs, the
next section provides an overview of structuration theory and how it can be used to
explore the role of a public health PIO in an emergency context by examining the
enactment of the PIO role, internal communication activities, and relationships with both
public health staff and external agencies.
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Structuration theory
Structuration theory is an especially useful framework for understanding the
process of emergency risk communication because public health PIOs function within a
highly developed and complex system of regulations and multiple government agencies.
In particular, structuration theory illustrates how the production and reproduction of
certain social structures can constrain and facilitate the communication process
(Falkhemier, 2007). Put simply, structuration theory examines “rules and resources
people draw on that simultaneously enable and constrain social interaction” (Bastien,
McPhee & Bolton, 1995, p. 88). Rules take the form of official or learned guidelines that
guide people’s actions (Hoffman & Cowan, 2010). In the context of public health
emergency preparedness activities, an official rule might be that federal grants require an
emergency risk communication plan to be written, while a learned rule might be that
creating a contact list of phone numbers will suffice as the emergency risk
communication plan. Resources are material and nonmaterial elements available for use
by the organizational member (Poole & McPhee, 2005). For public health PIOs,
resources take the form of policies and procedures, expert knowledge of emergency risk
communication, previous emergency experience, or networks outside the health
department.
Organizational structures take the form of rules and resources for PIOs and then
serve as both the medium and the outcome that can constrain or enable effective
communication processes. When PIOs are involved in emergency preparedness and
response activities, they draw on rules and resources to enact routine practices that (1) are
both official and learned rules within the public health department and (2) alter how the
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PIO interacts within the health department and also with other agencies. For example, a
PIO may not attend a particular meeting because it is not common practice for
communication experts to attend such meetings.
Communication literature applying the framework of structuration theory is
varied and spans three decades (Banks & Riley, 1993; Bastein, McPhee & Bolton, 1995;
Conrad, 1993; Garner, 2006; Howard & Geist, 1995; McPhee & Seibold, 1985; Nicotera,
2008; Poole, McPhee & Seibold, 1982; Witmer, 1997). Previous research has focused on
several concepts that are especially relevant to the current dissertation study: agent,
duality of structure and institutionalized processes.
Banks and Riley (1993) suggest communication scholars utilize Gidden’s
framework as “a set of ontological principles and entailments from which we can derive
questions, base research questions, and ground the development of communication theory
across the field’s many subspecialties” (p. 168). Further, Banks and Riley (1993) apply
structuration theory concepts to an organizational communication study investigating the
contexts of organizational setting, practical and discursive conscious, re-embedding of
social practices and power structures. The researchers learned that tensions arose in the
company due to cultural misunderstanding and organizational structures. It is important
to discover these tensions and offer practical implications that could change
organizational structures to benefit both employees’ well-being and organizational
production. In the context of public health PIOs, the concept of agent will be explored by
analyzing how the setting and expected modes of conduct impact the enactment of the
PIO role (the agent) by an organizational member. For this study, setting is determined by
the organizational structure of the health department. For example, because the PIO
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always operates in a specific context (e.g., situated in a single county or multi-county
health department) the organizational structure will impact the responsibilities of the PIO
role. Expected modes of conduct focuses on the expectations of that enacted role based
on social interactions of organizational members.
The concept of duality of structure is often analyzed by investigating how power
functions in relationships. Nicotera (2008) explores “interpenetration of multiple
structures” and structural divergence, or “negative spirals of communication interlocked
with one another” that exacerbate the organizational issue (p. 10). Structural divergence
accounts for a group of nurses’ inability to coordinate with each other and their inability
to develop professionally.
This immobilization stemmed from management styles and the position of nurses
within the organizational structure of the hospital. By discovering a potential cause for
the nurses’ problems, management could alter their management styles to give nurses the
ability to flourish within the organization. The structures within the hospital constrain the
ability of nurses to function and demonstrate how the production and reproduction of
social interactions within an organization can impede communication. The production
and reproduction of organizational structures is often described as the duality of structure.
On a broader scale, Witmer (1997) suggests that structuration theory can be used
to study “organizational culture as a manifestation of human collectivity and human
communication” (p. 344). An analysis of a local Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) group
revealed that members recreate themselves through enacting and reproducing structures
of the national AA mission. Further, Witmer explains how actors institutionalize their
actions by reconstructing themselves and reconstructing new group members. Witmer’s
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study reveals what Giddens (1984) describes as the duality of structure: “the structural
properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices they
recursively organize” (p. 24). For the current study, the concept of the duality of structure
provides a lens to analyze organizational emergency response structures facilitated and
constrained during emergency risk communication efforts that occurred during the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak.
Organizational structures, like NIMS and ICS, are inherent in emergency
responses. Structures used in routine emergencies provide the foundation for structures
that are used to respond to larger emergencies, and second, these structures must be
flexible to deal with the demands of the emergency (Lindell et al., 2007). The next
subsection provides more detail about the types of organizational structures that are used
in an emergency response and how these structures can be analyzed using the concept of
duality of structure.
Organizational structures.
In the 1970’s after repeated failures of lack of organization, poor on-scene and
interagency communication, inadequate planning and resource management, and lack of
timely intelligence, local firefighters led efforts to create a management system to
coordinate emergency response efforts (Annelli, 2005; Irwin, 2000; Lindell, Perry &
Prater, 2005). As a result, the Incident Command System (ICS) was created to ensure
effectiveness, accountability and communication across emergency responders (Annelli,
2005; Irwin, 2000). While ICS is the core structure of the system, the National Incident
Management System provided support to create multi-agency coordination systems,
unified command, training, identification and management of resources, certification, and
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reporting of incident information and resources (Annelli, 2005). Most incidents are local,
but when responders are faced with the worst-case scenario, such as the terrorist incidents
of September 11, 2001, all responding agencies must be able to interface and work
together. The NIMS, an in particular, the ICS component, allow that to happen, but only
if the foundation has been laid at the local level (Jemison, 2005, p. 5). Although some
government agencies have been using NIMS and ICS since the 1970’s, other agencies,
including public health, are relatively new to adopting the system. This is a concern
because compliance with NIMS and ICS is now required for health departments receiving
federal preparedness funds.
In 2005, the 43rd President of the United States issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, which required the Department of Homeland Security
to develop a national command system (Annelli, 2005; Jemison, 2005; George, 2007).
Prior to HSPD-5, local and state government agencies, such as public health, perceived
ICS as a fire service system and did not use the system. As a result, HSPD-5 required
compliance at all levels of government and “requires state and local adoption of NIMS as
a condition for receiving federal preparedness funds” (Jemison, 2005, p. 2; Lindell et al.,
2007). While the core of ICS and NIMS is to establish a mechanism in which emergency
responders can coordinate and allocated resources, there is also an emergency risk
communication component. ICS and NIMS focus on public information as either a
system or a physical center.
As discussed in Chapter One, the Joint Information System is the mechanism to
ensure information sharing and message fidelity among other response agencies, but the
Joint Information Center (JIC) is the physical structure where the PIO and other
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communication staff meet to facilitate information flow (DHS, 2008). PIOs should have
standard operating procedures for JIC personnel (DHS, 2007) and crisis communication
literature suggests creating these procedures during pre-crisis planning (Seeger et. al,
2003). NIMS establishes structures of the JIC with the following components:
information gathering, information dissemination and operations support; all of these
functions report directly to the PIO. While all of these systems and procedures are, in
theory, helpful to create share and coordinate information, the TOPOFF exercises provide
evidence that government agencies are not engaging in effective emergency risk
communication principles.
NIMS and ICS provide emergency procedures structures in which PIOs are to
operate during emergencies. These structures ultimately guide how the PIOs respond to
the emergency and also determine the outcome for the PIO’s action. For example, NIMS
protocol establishes a JIC in order for multiple agencies to coordinate messaging. NIMS
protocol guides the PIO to create a JIC and the outcome is that multiple agencies
coordinate messages. The theoretical concept of duality of structure provides the
appropriate lens for analysis in order to understand how these emergency response
facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication.
The third and final theoretical concept of structuration theory being used to frame
this study is institutionalized processes. Institutionalized processes are relevant to
analyzing the types of relationships PIOs create within public health departments, but
also across other agencies. Garner (2006) examined resource dependency and
interorganizational power relationships at NASA. Relationships with multiple external
stakeholders influence budgets, employee positions and other organizational decision27

making. Ultimately, NASA was not prepared to deal with these complexities and
structuration theory provided a lens through which to examine the lack of change at
NASA between the Challenger and Columbia disasters. NASA’s resource dependency on
multiple stakeholders constrained decision-makers and continued to reproduced resource
dependency structures “the macro-level structures between organization influence more
mirco-level encounters between engineers and managers” (p. Garner, 2006, p. 383). The
structural elements of multiple relationships are also a factor for health PIOs who
communicate with multiple internal and external stakeholders. The concept of
institutionalized processes provides a framework for analyzing how working
relationships form within health departments, but also across external agencies. Garner’s
study revealed the influence external relationships have over internal organizations
processes; it may be possible that PIOs’ external relationships with other agencies could
facilitate and constrain the health departments’ emergency risk communication efforts. In
addition to structuration theory, boundary-spanning literature provides another
perspective on how external and internal relationships impact communication efforts. The
next subsection provides more detail on boundary spanning literature and it informs this
study.
Boundary spanners.
Literature on communication practitioners as boundary spanners spans three
major topical areas: 1). overall functions of boundary spanners, 2). comparisons of
external and internal communication activities, and 3). the role of gatekeepers. Boundary
spanning literature is relevant to this study as it provides a foundation for understanding
how relationships form between PIOs, public health staff and external stakeholders.
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The functions of boundary spanners include facilitating external communication
with other organizations (Adams, 1979/1980; Burk, 1994; Coombs & Holladay, 2007;
Keller & Holland, 1975; Tuite, 2006; Tushman, 1977), gathering and filtering external
inputs (Adams, 1979/1980; Aldrich & Hercker, 1977; Jemison, 1984; Tuite, 2006),
managing uncertainty related to organizational threats (Adams, 1979/1980; Conrad,
1990; Coombs & Holladay, 2007) and organizing internal communication activities
(Adams, 1979/1980; Burk, 1994; Conrad, 1994; Conway, 1995; Jemison, 1984;
Tushman, 1977). Business and communication scholars have analyzed boundary
spanners roles related to external and internal communication activities. Specifically,
researchers were interested the relationship between external communication and
organizational performance (Dollinger, 1984; Johnson & Chang, 2000; Maneve &
Stevenson, 2001; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). Research findings suggest that
entrepreneurs ought to engage in external communication activities to support strategic
planning, but also to maintain current marketplace knowledge (Dollinger, 1984). Maneve
and Stevenson (2001) found that boundary spanners in government agencies often
communicate across organizational boundaries because of the nature of government
workers’ job responsibilities, which often required individuals to interact with people in
different agencies.
Boundary spanners are often referred to as “communication stars” (Tushman &
Scanlan, 1981, p. 290) indicating extensive external or internal communication
responsibilities. In an effort to extend boundary spanner literature, Tushman and Scanlan
(1981) investigated how work colleagues viewed boundary spanners’ competence,
power, and decision-making abilities. Their findings indicated that external
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communication stars were competent and often valued for their ability to obtain new
information; however, these individuals often did not have strong internal relationships
and were often viewed as less powerful than internal communication stars. Internal
communications stars were found to be more influential in the areas of administration and
strategic decision-making. However, boundary spanners with both external and internal
communication contacts are likely to be highly influential (Maneve & Stevenson, 2001).
This provides some insight as to how PIOs enact internal communication and
collaboration processes within their health departments; further, if a PIO has developed
substantial relationships with other emergency response agencies such as fire, law
enforcement, EMS or emergency management, it does not necessarily imply that a PIO
has strong relationships within his or her own health department.
Johnson and Chang (2000) explain that “boundary spanners acquire relevant
information from their extensive external contacts and filter and feed the information into
the organization” (p. 243), but that communication stars can fulfill both internal and
external communication roles. By analyzing an organizational undergoing three
innovations, the authors analyzed self-report data related to the number of internal and
external communication contacts made within a specified time period and found that,
overall, communication practitioners engaged in more external communication than
internal communication contacts. Again, while emergency preparedness literature and
training manuals encourage the development of relationships with stakeholders prior to a
crisis event (CDC, 2002; Seeger, 2006), even if the PIO has strong relationships with
external contacts, it does not imply strong internal communication and collaboration
activities. This study seeks to better understand how PIOs function within their health
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departments and boundary spanner literature provides a theoretical construct to explain
why, despite having strong ties to emergency management agencies, PIOs lack strong
internal communication and collaboration with public heath staff.
The third area of boundary spanner research focuses on the role of gatekeepers.
These roles are often focused on internal communication activities, and have been
referred to as “internal boundary spanners” (Spence & Reddy, 2007, p. 279). Gatekeepers
often mediate communication between departments or units and ensure that information
shared is understood and not misperceived due to different language or coding schemes
(Spence and Reddy, 2007; Tushman & Katz, 1980). The role of gatekeepers to decode
department-specific language was also supported by Tushman’s (1977) study on
gatekeepers in a research and development unit of a company. He found two different
types of gatekeepers—research and technical service. Research gatekeepers often focused
information filtering in professional areas, while technical service gatekeepers focused on
information related to operational areas. PIOs often enact the role of a gatekeeper during
emergency responses as they gather and verify information about the crisis event.
While social science research is plentiful for describing the functions of
communication practitioners as boundary spanners, comparisons of internal and external
communication activities, and their roles as gatekeepers, there is very limited research on
the boundary spanners as public information officers. Ankey and Curtin (2002) explicitly
link the role of public information officers as a boundary spanning function. In their
public relations and health communication study, they analyzed how public information
officers serve in a boundary spanner function between medical experts and journalists.
The study had two major findings related to hospital public information officers. First,
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physicians credit hospital public information officers with developing and pitching
medical stories to newspaper media, but cardiac surgeon do not perceive much value in
public information officers. Second, public information officers can play a major role in
facilitating media coverage of medical and health-related stories and events.
This chapter provided a review of relevant literature on public information
officers, structuration theory, organizational structures for emergency response and
boundary spanners. Structuration theory provides the primary framework for addressing
how organizational structures impact emergency risk communication efforts, how the
enactment of PIOs is similar or different across multiple states, and to what extent social
structures impact internal and external relationships. The literature on organizational
structures for emergency responses provides a brief overview of what types of structures
are used for emergency responses and how those structures could facilitate or constrain
emergency risk communication efforts. The literature review ends with a brief overview
of boundary spanning literature. Boundary spanning literature informs this study
providing a foundation to understand the types of relationships that PIOs develop within
the health department and across agencies.
As previously mentioned, due to the limited research related to PIOs and their role
in emergencies, this dissertation has the potential to be at the forefront of an emerging
research area that has the potential to improve the risk communication competencies of
PIOs during emergencies. As society continues to face man-made and natural disasters,
government agencies and other emergency response organizations must be confident that
the PIOs will competently engage the public through efficient emergency risk
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communication practices that will effectively reduce harm and injury to those affected by
the emergency. This dissertation seeks to addresses three broad research questions:
1) What are the implicit and explicit structures that constrain and facilitate
emergency risk communication produced by public health PIOs during the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak?
2) How do implicit and explicit structures impact the enactment of the PIO role and
are they different or similar depending upon the state in which the individual is
located?
3) In what ways are institutionalized processes related to PIOs’ internal and external
partnerships?
The review of existing literature pertaining to public information officers established
that little is known about the how organizational structures impact emergency risk
communication efforts, how the enactment of PIOs is similar or different across multiple
states, and to what extent social structures impact internal and external relationships. This
dissertation seeks to improve understanding of PIOs by addressing each of the research
questions identified above by using interpretive methods and semi-structured interviews.
The next chapter provides an overview of the methods that will be used to answer the
broad research questions posed in this dissertation.
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Chapter Three: Methods
In order to answer three broad research questions outlined in the proceeding
chapter, this chapter provides information related to the study’s research design,
recruitment strategy and data analysis procedures. The primary goal of this dissertation is
understand how organizational structures impact emergency risk communication efforts,
how the enactment of PIOs is similar or different across multiple states and to what
extent social structures impact internal and external relationships. This dissertation will
use in-depth, semi-structured interviews as the primary method of gathering data.
Approximately 90% of all social science investigations rely on interview data (Briggs,
1986).
Research Design
An interpretive approach was used for this study. Using an interpretive method
allowed the PIOs to provide personal insights by sharing their “stories, accounts and
explanations” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 173). The individual’s personal experiences
provides data that can be examined and analyzed to reveal any organizational structures
enabling or impeding his or her communicative practices during the emergency response
to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. By asking research participants to share their personal
stories and examples, the data collected provides a holistic picture of what an emergency
response looks like for public health departments, while also revealing specific activities
of individuals in that context (Alam, 2005; Creswell, 2003; Patton, 2002).

34

Participant Recruitment
Convenience sampling was used to recruit participants for this study. Participants
for this study were current public health PIOs or individuals who served in the role of
PIO during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. The only additional exclusion criteria was
based on geographical location. PIOs had to be based in the four states included in this
study (i.e., Kentucky, North Dakota, New Jersey and California).
A total of 58 individuals participated in this study (43 females; 15 males). Thirtyseven were in based in Kentucky, five were based in North Dakota, six were based in
New Jersey and eleven were based in California. The gender distribution of the sample is
reflective of the population. According CDC personnel who regularly work with PIOs
during public health emergencies, the field is overtly dominated by females (K. Lubell,
personal communication, April 26, 2011).
The four states included in this study were chosen for three reasons: personal
contacts, geographic location and advisement by the author’s doctoral committee. First,
the author had established contacts in North Dakota since she developed working as a
PIO in a local public health department from 2006-2008; however, since there were only
8 PIOs in the entire state, the author included Kentucky to increase the number of
participants and to get another state’s local public health perspective on the emergency
response to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Since the author was based at the University of Kentucky for her doctoral studies,
it was appropriate to talk with PIOs located in the same state. In addition, Kentucky has a
unique public health system with over 120 county based health departments serving the
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state’s needs. Unlike North Dakota in which there are only 8 PIOs, Kentucky has 65
individuals identified as emergency response PIOs. Participants for North Dakota were
contacted through the author’s professional contacts she obtained while working as a
public health PIO in North Dakota from 2006 to 2008. Obtaining PIO contact
information was more difficult in Kentucky. After cold calling health departments in
Kentucky for PIOs’ contact information, Alice, a PIO from a district health department,
shared an email list-serv of all PIOs in the state with the author. Alice became a key
informant for this study and later assisted with member checks.
In addition to Kentucky and North Dakota, PIOs from two additional states were
included in the sample in order to minimize bias. Turnock (2009) has suggested that
public health systems vary greatly from state to state due to public health governance
laws. Due to the author’s personal contacts through her work in previous local public
health and her new position at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New
Jersey and California were added to the sample. As a result, this study’s sample provides
a unique perspective from individuals in four district geographic areas: the Midwest
(North Dakota), the East Coast (New Jersey), the South (Kentucky), and the West Coast
(California).
Although not generalizable, this sample provides a less biased perspective than if
the study had included only PIOs working in the state of Kentucky. Detailed information
about structural differences across each of the four states is provided below to highlight
key demographic information about each state included in this study.
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Kentucky.
According to the CDC’s Snap Shots of State Population Data [SNAPS] compiled
from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2003 CDC databases, Kentucky’s total population is
approximately 4 million with English, Spanish, German and French as the top four
languages spoken at home (SNAPS, 2007). There are 120 counties within the state
(“Kentucky Counties,” n.d.) and 37 PIOs were interviewed for this study. The PIOs
represented single county health department and multicounty, or as they are called in
Kentucky, district health departments. There are 15 district health departments and 42
single county health departments. Of the 36 Kentucky participants (25 female and 11
male), 19 represented single county health departments, 16 represented district health
departments, and one represented a city-county health department. Additionally, only six
of the Kentucky participants work as a PIO or conduct communication activities on a
daily basis. The remaining 36 individuals work in non-communication public health
positions on a daily basis. The number of years the individual worked in public health
varied across the different types of health departments. For example, 19 participants had
served in the role for five years or less, 11 for 9-15 years, 5 for 16-20 years and 1 had
served in their role for longer than 20 years. See Table 3.1 for more information about the
demographics of the participants from Kentucky.
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Table 3.1. Demographics for Kentucky Participants
Type of
Dept
Single
county

Years/Exp
1-5 years

5-9 years

10-15 years
District
health

1-5 years

5-9 years

10-15 years

Citycounty
Total

16-20 years
10-15 years

Title
Public Information Officer
Communications Officer/specialist
Director of Nursing
Director of Administrative Services
Human Resources
Health Director
Training Coordinator
Preparedness Coordinator
Epidemiologist
Director of Development and
Communications
Director/Manager of Health
Education
Health Director
Health Educator
Public Information Officer
Branch Manager for Health
Information
Health Director
Health Educator
Epidemiologist
Public Health Services Coordinator
Environmental Health Specialist
Health Director
Health Educator
Preparedness Coordinator
Health Director
Health Educator
Health Director
Public Information Officer

Sex
Female Male
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
25
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North Dakota.
According to the CDC’s Snap Shots of State Population Data [SNAPS] compiled
from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2003 CDC databases, North Dakota’s total population is
643,200 with English, German and Spanish as the top three languages spoken at home
(SNAPS, 2007). For public health, there are eight emergency preparedness regions within
the state; each region has a dedicated Public Information Officer (PIO) who serves more
than one health department in their designated region (NDDoH, 2005). The author
emailed all eight PIOs and five initially agreed to participate in the study. One PIO
assisted with the creation of the interview guide.
Since 2007 when the author left her position with public health, considerable
employee turnover occurred. Three of the eight PIOs she worked had left their respective
health departments; one PIO position has yet to be replaced (personal communication,
2010). The communications director for the state public health emergency preparedness
division moved to Washington, DC in January 2011 (personal communication, 2010).
Of the five North Dakota participants (four female, one male), one represented the state
health department, one represented a city-county health department and two represented
multi-county health departments. Unlike Kentucky, these multi-county health
departments are not formally as district health departments. All participants work as
public information officers on daily basis and have worked in that role for less than five
years. Please see Table 3.2 for more information about the demographics of the
participants from North Dakota.
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Table 3.2. Demographics for North Dakota Participants
Type of Dept Years/Exp
State health
1-5 years

Title
PIO

Female
1

City-county

1-5 years

PIO

1

Multi-county

1-5 years

PIO

2

Total

Male

4

1
1

New Jersey.
According to the CDC’s Snap Shots of State Population Data [SNAPS] compiled
from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2003 CDC databases, New Jersey’s total population is
8,414,350 with English, Spanish and Italian as the top three languages, out of 36, spoken
at home (SNAPS, 2007). The state has a diverse public health statewide structure
with112 local health departments covering the State’s 566 municipalities to include
municipal health departments, regional health commissions and county health
departments. Each of the state’s 21 counties has authorization to establish county health
departments.
As of 2008, 19 county health departments serve 20 of New Jersey’s 21 counties
and provide local public health services for a majority of the municipalities (NJDHHS,
2008). Many of the health departments report number of employed staff by each local
health department ranges from 3 to 380. 26 health departments employ less than 10
people (NJHSS, 2008). Of the 112 local health departments there are 86 municipal health
departments, 7 regional health commissions, and 19 county health departments
(NJDHHS, 2008).
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Of the 7 regional health commissions, 5 function as multi-municipality local
health departments and 2 solely provide environmental health and emergency
preparedness support to the local health departments in the counties (NJHHS, 2008).
As outlined in the state’s Emergency Health Powers Act (Public Law 2005, c. 222),
NJHHS designated 22 local health departments (including the two regional health
commissions) to create the Local Information Network and Communication System
(LINCS) agencies to lead health emergency planning and response. The LINCS agencies
would “also provide specialized public health expertise and capacities, as defined in the
“Practice Standards,” to the other local health departments in their county (NJHHS, 2008,
p. 13-14). In addition to the creation of physical agencies, communication systems were
also put into place to facilitate emergency communication within the state. NJ LINCS
Health Alert Network is a system of public health professionals and electronic public
health information that enhances the identification and containment of diseases and
hazardous conditions that threaten the public's health (NJDHSS, 2010).
Of the six participants from New Jersey (five female, one male), one represented
the state health department, three represented single county health departments, and two
represented regional health commissions. New Jersey was the only state in this study to
have health commissions integrated into the public health system. Four of the participants
had served in their communication for at least five up to nine years and two had worked
in their position for less than two years.
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Like Kentucky, there was one individual who worked in a non-communication role, but
the other five participants worked directly on communication activities on a daily basis.
See Table 3.3 for more information on the demographics of these participants.

Table 3.3 Demographics for New Jersey Participants
Sex
Type of Dept Years/Exp
Single county 1-5 years

5-9 years
State health

5-9 years

Health
commission
Total

5-9 years

Title
Public Information Officer

Female

Male
1

Health Educator Risk
Communicator

1

Director/Manager of Health
Education
Risk Communication
Manager
Health Educator Risk
Communicator

1
1
2
5

1

California.
According to the CDC’s Snap Shots of State Population Data [SNAPS] compiled
from the 2000 U.S. Census and 2003 CDC databases, California’s total population is 33.8
million with English, Spanish, and Tagalog as the top three languages, out of 58, spoken
at home (SNAPS, 2007). There are local health departments in each of California’s 58
counties and three that operate as city health departments in Berkeley, Long Beach and
Pasadena (“Be Prepared California,” n.d.).
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Of the 11 California participants (nine female, two male), seven represented
single county health departments, one represented a county health department and one
represented an integrated health system. Four of the participants work in communication
activities on a daily basis, the remaining seven work in other non-communication based
public health staff roles. Four participants had worked in their public staff role for less
than five years, one had worked in the role for at least five years, three had worked in that
role at least ten years, and one worked in the role for over 16 years.

Table 3.4. Demographics for California Participants
Sex
Female Male

Type of Dept Years/Exp

Title

Single county 1-5 years

Communications
Officer/specialist

2

Preparedness Coordinator

1

5-9 years

Director/Manager of Health
Education

1

10-15 years

Public Information Officer

2

Hospital Preparedness
Coordinator

1

16-20 years

Health Program Manager

1
1

City-county

10-15 years

Director/Manager of Health
Education
Public Information Officer

Health
system
Total

1-5 years

Communications
Officer/specialist

1

1

9
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Data collection.
Phone interviews were conducted during an eight-month period beginning in
February 2010 and ending in December 2010. When beginning the phone interviews, the
author restated the purpose of the study, obtained permission for audio recording, and
assured participants of confidentiality (wa Nugla & Miller, 2010). Informed consent was
obtained orally. After informed consent was granted, the author began recording the
interview. After small talk to build rapport with the participant, questions related to
pandemic planning were asked. The participants were asked to share examples and
stories of their experiences during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. They were then lead
through a series of six main questions addressing the types of emergency plans that were
place prior to the outbreak, their involvement in creating the plans, their work
relationships with other public health colleagues, their work relationships with other first
responders external to the health department, and their experiences during the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak. The author identified a series of probing questions to elicit more
information from participants based on the six main questions. “Quite simply, a probe is
a follow-up question used to go deeper into the interviewee’s responses. As such, probes
should be conversational, offered in natural style and voice, and used to follow up on
initial responses” (Patton, 2002, p. 372).
The interview questions were created using the lens of structuration theory and,
specifically, the concepts of agent, duality of structure, and institutionalized processes.
These theoretical concepts guided the development of the interview guide in order to
elicit answers related to organizational structures, enactment of the PIO and types of
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relationships the PIO developed and maintained during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
For example, the first question (“As a public information officer, describe your
involvement in pandemic influenza planning.”) focuses on how the individual enacts her
or his role in the planning process. Probing questions for this first interview question (“If
you are not involved now, is this type of planning something that you would be interested
in being more involved with in the future?” “Would you feel comfortable asking to be
involved? Why or why not?”) seeks to better understand the reasons why the individual
was or was not involved in the planning process (See Appendix A for the entire interview
guide). Understanding why the individual was or was not involved starts to reveal the
similarities and differences in how the PIO role is enacted differently across the four
states included in this study.
An interview guide was used to ensure all interviewees heard the same questions
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002), but the questions were not necessarily asked in the order they
were given. The first research question (“As a public information officer, describe your
involvement in pandemic influenza planning”) was always asked first, but if the
individual was not involved in pandemic planning, the author was able to move to
another question that seemed relevant to the conversation at-hand without violating the
established interview protocol.
For example, if an individual was not involved in the planning process, the author
would then move to the third question (“Describe your involvement in writing a crisis
communication plan”). This question too revealed information about the enactment of the
PIO role, but it also focused on organizational structures that were in place during the
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2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Since questions were not necessarily asked in the same order
as what is written in the interview guide (See Appendix A), questions were asked based
on the interviewees’ responses in order to avoid imposing the logic of an a priori
framework (Alam, 2005; Jackson et al., 2007). Semi-structured interviews also provided
an opportunity for follow-up questions on an issue or problem that the researcher may not
have originally considered. In accordance with advice from a seasoned qualitative
researcher, demographic questions were asked at the end of the interview: “background
and demographic questions are basically boring; they epitomize what people hate about
interviews. I advise never beginning an interview with a long list of routine demographic
questions” (Patton, 2002, p. 352).
The interviews were semi-structured and ranged from 15 to 55 minutes in length.
Despite the variation in the length of the interviews, the author transcribed all of the
interview data. After transcribing, the author first read through the two 15-minute
interviews (from Kentucky PIOs) to see if there was any useful data to glean from the
small amount of data provided. The author found the only useful data that was the
demographic information that was obtained at the end of the interview. As a result, these
transcriptions were not included in the analysis since they did not produce any viable
information for this study. Additionally, the variation in length was also due to the
involvement of the PIO in planning and response activities. As the analysis reveals in
Chapter Four, some PIOs were actively involved in planning and response, while others
were only involved in the H1N1 emergency response. As a result, some were able to
provide more information than others thus resulting in longer interviews.
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Two PIOs (Janet and Charles) did not want to participate in a phone interview and
submitted their answers via an email questionnaire. When sending the questionnaire, the
author requested the ability to follow up via phone or email if she had any questions; both
participants agreed. The author did not have any follow-up questions based on the
information provided by the two email respondents.
The author, given time constraints, did her best to contact PIOs in each state until
theoretical saturation occurred. Unfortunately, due to the convenience of the Kentucky
PIOs, there is a greater representation of PIO data from this state than in the other three
states included in this study. Glaser and Strauss (1967) explain that saturation occurs
when no new data are found from the participation of research participants. Additionally,
saturation ensures replication of data related to the theoretical constructs guiding the
study; in turn, replication ensures and verifies comprehension and completeness of data
collection related to a specific phenomenon (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson & Spiers,
2002).
For this study, saturation occurred when PIOs provided similar stories and
examples when answering questions about their involvement in pandemic planning and
response activities. For North Dakota, saturation occurred after five interviews were
completed. North Dakota only has eight PIOs in the state. The three not included in this
study had moved out of the state or taken new jobs and were unavailable to participate.
For Kentucky, over thirty PIOs were included in the study. Saturation occurred in New
Jersey after six interviews; the individuals in the study provided very similar answers and
the author deemed saturation occurred. Saturation did not occur in California, but given
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time constraints and the inability to locate PIOs to participate in the study, the author
stopped data collection at the end of December 2010. Participants were first contacted via
email inviting them to participate in the study (See Appendix B for recruitment emails).
If participants did not reply to the first email, a second follow-up email was sent two
weeks after the first initial contact. The interviewees were informed that the phone
interview was being recorded before the interview began, and the researcher obtained
verbal consent before officially beginning the interview. Since the interviews were not
conducted fact to face, the researcher obtained verbal consent from the participants
consistent with approval from the University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity
(ORI) and Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The semi-structured, in-depth interviews were recorded with a digital recorder
and then later transcribed by the researcher. The digital interview files and transcribed
materials were kept on the researcher’s password protected computer. The researcher
obtained approval from the University of Kentucky Office of Research Integrity in
February 2010. In accordance with the University of Kentucky Office of Research
Integrity IRB approval form, pseudonyms are used throughout this document to protect
participant confidentiality. Any references to county names or other individuals have
been changed; the only identifying information is the state in which the PIO’s health
department is located. The author transcribed the interviews and began analysis in
December 2010. A thematic comparative analysis was conducted. Initially the author
analyzed the data looking for key themes in the data from each state.
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In January 2011, preliminary analyses of each state were sent to key informants to
conduct member checks to ensure the validity of the initial interpretations of the data
(Jackson et. al, 2007). To conduct a member check, the researcher emailed a preliminary
analysis of categorized by state to respective key informants. More information on
conducting member checks ins included in the following section on data analysis.
Data Analysis
After the data collection was completed, an analytical inductive analysis was
conducted (Patton, 2002). This type of analysis used structuration concepts to initially
make sense of the raw data generated by the participants in the states included in this
study, but this type of analysis also gives the researcher the ability to search for patterns
that cut across the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1986; Patton, 2002). The following
paragraphs provided step-by-step information of how the author analyzed the data.
First, after all data were collected and all interviews were transcribed, the
researcher analyzed the interview transcripts using three specific structuration themes.
This type of analysis is described as analytic induction since the
qualitative analysis is first deductive or quasi-deductive and then inductive as
when, for example, the analyst begins by examining the data in terms of theoryderived sensitizing concepts or applying a theoretical framework developed by
someone else. After or alongside this deductive phase of the analysis, the
researcher strives to look at the data afresh for undiscovered patterns and
emergent understanding (inductive analysis) (Patton, 2002, p. 454).
Based upon on Patton’s guidance, the author used the theoretical concepts of duality of
structure, agent, and institutionalized processes as “sensitizing concepts” thus giving the
author a specific lens in which to view the raw interview data. Upon completion of
transcription, the author read and reviewed each interview transcript, taking notes to
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describe examples of each of the structuration themes. These examples were also
highlighted and marked so the author could include them as examples to support her
claims made in Chapter Four. Again, the author used the sensitizing concepts of duality
of structure, agent, and institutionalized processes in examining the interview data and to
understand if and how these concepts were manifested by individuals serving as PIOs
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Second, the author’s notes and relevant examples that were developed and
identified using the sensitizing concepts (duality of structure, agent, and institutionalized
processes) were compared across all interview transcripts and thus across each of the four
states. The author then drafted preliminary analyses of the findings categorized by state.
For example, the author wrote findings for Kentucky based upon each of the three
sensitizing concepts and provided relevant examples of each concept. A brief summary of
the findings was also included at the end of these preliminary analyses. This same style
and format was replicated for each subsequent state.
Third, upon the completion of the preliminary analysis, the author emailed those
documents to pre-indentified key informants in each state. The author asked each key
informant to perform a member check or member validation (Lindlof, 2002). “Member
validation means taking findings back to the field and determining whether the
participants recognize them as true or accurate” (Lindlof, 2002, p. 242). Within the email
sent to the key informants, the author asked them to consider the following questions as
they read the document: “Does this document make sense? Does did accurately represent
PIOs in your state?” These questions were adapted from questions used by other
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qualitative researchers (Lindlof, 2002). None of the key informants had any substantial
changes to the preliminary analyses. Most of the comments were focused on typos found
in the document. The New Jersey key informant asked the author to update information
about the LINCS agencies in the state. This was the only feedback that required the
author to make a factual change in the analysis.
Fourth, after the preliminary analyses had been checked by the key informants,
the author began to compare the findings across each state looking for patterns and
relationships among the sensitizing concepts. Using analytical induction data analysis,
along with the methods detailed in this chapter, the author used three theoretical
constructs (duality of structure, agent, and institutionalized processes) as sensitizing
concepts that provide specific lens through which the raw interview data will be
analyzed. By organizing the raw data using the sensitizing concepts, the author could use
the vast amount of data generated by the interviews to answer each of the three research
questions using both a general macro approach as well as micro within-state analyses.
For example, the first research question asks, “What are the implicit and explicit
structures that constrain and facilitate emergency risk communication produced by public
health PIOs during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak?” The results and analysis for the first
research question are related to duality of structure (e.g., explicit structures within
emergency planning and response activities) and focus interview responses related to the
on policies and procedures that were created prior to and during the 2009-2010 H1N1
outbreak. Based upon the data generated in the interviews and using the sensitizing
concept of duality of structure, the author looked for how the concept of duality of
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structure manifested in the PIOs interview transcripts. The second research question asks,
“How do implicit and explicit structures impact the enactment of the PIO role and are
they different or similar depending upon the state in which the individual is located?” The
results and analysis of the second research question are related to agent (e.g., implicit and
explicit structures of the PIO role) and focus on interview responses related PIOs’ job
responsibilities, other job expectations created for them by their work colleagues and
organizational structures of each state’s health departments. Based on the data generated
in the interviews and using the sensitizing concept of agent, the author looked for how the
concept of agent manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts.
The third research question asks, “In what ways are institutionalized processes
related to PIOs’ internal and external partnerships?” The results and analysis for the third
research question are related to institutionalized processes (e.g., working partnerships of
emergency preparedness and response) and focus interview responses related to PIOs’
collaborations with public health staff, community organizations and national
organizations. Based on the data generated in the interviews and using the sensitizing
concept of institutionalized processes, the author looked for how the concept of
institutionalized processes is manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts. Within
Chapter Four, each research question is restated. Then results and analysis are provided
along with representative examples from a range of interviewees that support and verify
each of the three theoretical concepts (duality of structure, agent, and institutionalized
processes) related to structuration theory.
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In conclusion, this chapter provided an overview of the study design, participant
recruitment procedures, methods, and step-by-step data analysis procedures that were
used to answer the three research questions outlined in Chapter Two. The next chapter
will explicitly answer the study’s research questions using data generated from the
participant interviews.

Copyright © Kathleen G. Vidoloff 2011
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Chapter Four: Results and Analysis
The major findings for each research question are presented in this chapter. Using
analytical induction data analysis, along with the methods detailed in previous chapter,
the author used three theoretical constructs (duality of structure, agent, and
institutionalized processes) as sensitizing concepts that provide specific lens through
which the raw interview data will be analyzed. By organizing the raw data using the
sensitizing concepts, the author could use the vast amount of data generated by the
interviews to answer each of the three research questions using both a general macro
approach as well as micro within-state analyses.
The first research question asks, “What are the implicit and explicit structures that
constrain and facilitate emergency risk communication produced by public health PIOs
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak?” The results and analysis for the first research
question are related to duality of structure (e.g., explicit structures within emergency
planning and response activities) and focus interview responses related to the on policies
and procedures that were created prior to and during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Based upon the data generated in the interviews and using the sensitizing concept of
duality of structure, the author looked for how the concept of duality of structure
manifested in the PIOs interview transcripts.
For example, many PIOs revealed how their emergency response plans were key
in helping them to respond during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Further, the interviews
revealed how some types of emergency response plans were clearly more helpful than
others. As a result, the author began to classify emergency response plans as an
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organizational structure. Additionally, based on the interview data, the author
characterized emergency response plans as explicit structures because they were written
down and considered an organizational policy. Again, these classifications were based
upon the theoretical concept of duality of structure. For public health PIOs, emergency
plans contained policies and procedures that outlined emergency risk communication
efforts. The plans were created to guide PIOs to take a specific action.
The second research question asks, “How do implicit and explicit structures
impact the enactment of the PIO role and are they different or similar depending upon the
state in which the individual is located?” The results and analysis of the second research
question are related to agent (e.g., implicit and explicit structures of the PIO role) and
focus on interview responses related PIOs’ job responsibilities, other job expectations
created for them by their work colleagues and organizational structures of each state’s
health departments. Based on the data generated in the interviews and using the
sensitizing concept of agent, the author looked for how the concept of agent manifested
in the PIOs’ interview transcripts. For example, the author classified PIOs’ additional job
expectations—those that were not included in the PIOs’ job description—as implicit
structures because those additional expectations were upheld as an unwritten rule within
the health department. As a result, PIOs were expected to conduct certain functions
based upon implied structures created by their colleagues. Additionally, the organization
of the public health systems in each state contributed to how PIOs enacted their roles in
the areas of emergency planning and response. The organization of health systems are
explicit structures since they are written and used as local government policy.
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The third research question asks, “In what ways are institutionalized processes
related to PIOs’ internal and external partnerships?” The results and analysis for the third
research question are related to institutionalized processes (e.g., working partnerships of
emergency preparedness and response) and focus interview responses related to PIOs’
collaborations with public health staff, community organizations and national
organizations. Based on the data generated in the interviews and using the sensitizing
concept of institutionalized processes, the author looked for how the concept of
institutionalized processes manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts. For example,
during their interviews PIOs described how NIMS and ICS often dictated the
relationships health departments established with other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector during emergencies at the
local and state level. Based upon their descriptions of their relationships, the author
developed a descriptive classification system of the PIOs partnerships. The author created
three classes: internal partnerships, locally-based external partnerships, and nationallybased external partnerships. First, internal partnerships were those found within the PIO’s
health department. Second, locally-based partnerships were those partnerships that were
developed external to the health department. Third, externally-based partnerships were
those that were external to the health department and the state where the PIO was
situated.
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This chapter will be organized in the following way. Each research question will
be stated, followed by a general macro description and analysis of the study’s findings
using relevant examples from the data. Each section concludes with a section summary
which includes a micro within-state analysis. The following section answers the first
research question by discussing the study’s findings related to explicit organizational
structures.
Research Question One: What are the explicit structures that constrain and
facilitate emergency risk communication produced by public health PIOs during the
2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak?
The results and analysis for the first research question are related to duality of structure
(e.g., explicit structures within emergency planning and response activities) and focus on
interview responses related to the policies and procedures that were created prior to and
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Most health departments included in this study
created some type of emergency response plan, policy and procedure prior to the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak. Based on the data generated in the interviews and using the
sensitizing concept of duality of structure, the author looked for how the concept of
duality of structure is manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts.
Using the duality of structure to guide the analysis of data is relevant as it reveals
how—as explicit structures—emergency response plans, policies and procedures can
both facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication. Emergency response plans,
policies and procedures are classified as explicit structures because they are written
documents and are used as organizational policy. A key factor in how explicit
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organizational structures facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication is
dependent upon the permeability, or looseness, of the plans, policies and procedures
(Giddens, 1984). Permeability provides organizations with the ability to adapt the
explicit structures (e.g., emergency plans, policies and procedures) to the emergency
context. For example, emergency response plans that are more flexible allow PIOs to
adapt the plan for the emergency response as needed. Those involved in emergency
response know that responding to different types of emergencies creates different types of
environmental constraints and communication exigencies.
Basic plans imply that standard-operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency risk
communication were in place prior to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Basic plans were
also more flexible and allowed PIOs to adapt the emergency risk communication plan as
needed. These types of plans are explicit organizational structures that facilitate
emergency risk communication. No plans indicate there was no written plan prior to the
2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Worst-case scenario plans indicate a rigid plan intended for a
1918-like pandemic. No plans and worst-case scenario plans are explicit organizational
structures that constrain emergency risk communication.
In order to answer the first research question, a general macro description and
analysis of explicit organizational structures that facilitate emergency risk
communication will be provided. Then a general macro description and analysis of
explicit organizational structures that constrain emergency risk communication will be
provided. Finally, a micro within-state analysis is provided in the section summary.
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The following section provides a macro description and analysis of explicit
organizational structures that facilitate emergency risk communication is provided.
Explicit structures that facilitated emergency risk communication
Based upon interview data from PIOs involved in the 2009-2010 H1N1 response,
participants often described emergency response plans as basic plans, implying that
standard-operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency risk communication were in place
prior to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. As a result, these emergency plans took the form
of explicit structures that facilitated emergency risk communication.
Basic plans afforded PIOs a flexibility that no plans or worst-case scenario plans
did not because the emergency response plan could be adapted to the fit the evolving
outbreak. Here basic plans had a level of permeability that the other plans did not. The
key factor in how these basic plans facilitated emergency risk communication rests upon
the permeability or flexibility of the plan to be adapted the emergency context as needed.
In order to develop basic and flexible emergency risk communication plans with
permeability, PIOs and public health staff look to guidance from reputable sources
including their own state health department and CDC. The following paragraphs provide
a general macro approach of description and analysis of relevant examples New Jersey,
Kentucky and California PIOs. North Dakota PIOs only reported developing worst-case
scenario plans.
At the state level in New Jersey, David, who was one of the communication
officers during the 2001 anthrax attacks, was very actively involved in writing and
developing emergency risk communication plans:
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I had a great to deal to do with putting the preparedness plan together starting
back in the mid 2000’s—2003—2004 putting together incorporating our overall
risk communication plan with our pandemic plan and making sure that had
synergy. I have refined it several times, trained our staff and our locals as well as
other state agencies that would be involved agriculture, education, transportation,
and our governor’s office.
Here David explains the development the communication plan and his interactions with
other staff. As his comments reveal he had direct control over the materials included in
the an emergency risk communication plan, and he had the ability to refine the plan and
change it as needed. David’s comments reveal the permeability of the plan as he
describes incorporating with overall pandemic influenza plan. After he developed the
emergency risk communication plan, David went on to train others about the policies and
procedures of the plan. Through sharing the plan with local health departments, David
was able to give others a pre-developed plan which could be adapted to fit the needs of a
given community. Since the basic plan is permeable, other PIOs would be able to change
the plan as needed.
For example, Melissa, a HERC from a single county health department in New
Jersey, described the state guidance’s on creating policies and procedures related to
emergency risk communication. She mentions the state provided templates, but then the
HERCs inserted local information where needed:
The state had us create a risk communication toolkit. So we have contact lists,
basic rules and principles of risk communication, our call down list, our activation
lists. We have our public information communication plan in here and our SNS
communication plan, steps to take when the media calls, I mean it’s pretty
extensive. Fact sheets and FAQ’s and we have pandemic and avian flu message
maps.
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Again, Melissa, a county HERC, was able to use the plan that David, a state PIO, created.
Here the pre-developed emergency response plans was adapted by the local public health
departments and adapted to fit the community’s need. The adaptability of the emergency
response plans reflects the permeability of the organizational structures. Using predeveloped templates and other state’s emergency response plans as examples guide PIOs
as they develop emergency risk communication procedures.
The flexibility of emergency plans and protocols was also reported by PIOs in
Kentucky. Clara, an emergency preparedness coordinator at a single county health
department, defines her emergency plan as a ‘working document’ that can be adapted as
needed:
We do have a plan that was it’s a working document that we started to develop
way before H1N1 and its contents were how we were reach the public, the ways
we were going to do that and targeting them with where we would do their points
of dispensing and where they would get their information and we included a lot of
community partners including physicians’ offices, churches, factories, other
agencies in town in order to have places in town where the public to get their
information.
Clara’s comments reveal the level of specificity in what they would do and who they we
would work with, but she highlights that plan is not complete. Intuitively, an incomplete
plan may cause alarm, but in reality the working plan allows PIOs to adapt the contents
(such as pre-developed communication messages) as needed. The recognition of working
plans or plans with permeability was also reported in California.
Mary, who works for the integrated health system in California, had a similar
perspective. The “all-hazards” plan she helped developed does not represent rigid
procedures and policies: “It’s a living document that we update it whenever we need to.”
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Mary and her team of communicators have direct access to the plan and can update the
emergency risk communication plan as needed. In rare occasions they need leadership
approval for changes. Additionally, Richard, a single county PIO in California, explains
that plans ought to be adaptable for the situation:
This really was a communication plan for what we would do in the event of
pandemic flu, and I think in reality, you know, what happened is that in any
emergency you’ve got plans and you make changes as you need to respond
properly to the situation.
Richard’s comments here echo the same sentiment of the other PIOs and highlight the
importance of flexibility within emergency response structures. Although the plans were
in place prior the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, some of these pre-developed social
structures were not appropriate for the evolving influenza pandemic. As a result, as the
plans changed and guided PIOs to take different actions, the outcome of those plans
changed as well. As the plans were adapted based on the new information, the production
and reproduction of social structures occurred.
Since LPHDs had been planning for a pandemic influenza since 2002, most
communication materials, such as educational materials, brochures, pre-developed
talking points, message maps and sample messages, focused on the H5N1 pandemic
influenza. H5N1, avian influenza or bird flu, was considered to be the strain to cause a
pandemic; however, it was H1N1, or swine flu, that initiated the 2009-2010 pandemic
influenza. As a result, PIOs either updated pre-developed materials or created new
materials.
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California PIOs reported challenges and successes with emergency message
development. Mary and Richard were able to update and “tweak” their premade
communication materials to fit the 2009-2010 H1N1 response. Sharon, who primarily
works as a hospital preparedness coordinator in California, remembered working directly
with her public health colleagues to adapt pre-developed messages because “we found
that most of our prescripted messages were not appropriate for H1N1 they were phrased
in terms of a very severe bird flu and they were too specific the virus and that situation.”
The revision of premade communication materials is similar to how PIOs dealt with the
emergency response plans that were not appropriate for this type of influenza pandemic.
As a result, the PIOs once again able to adapt the premade materials as needed.
While many PIOs across the states were involved in some form of pandemic planning,
Charles, who serves as a Communication Specialist for a single county health department
in California, was not on staff as the PIO at his health department when most of the
pandemic influenza planning occurred.
As a result, he was responsible for using a plan that he did not develop, but he
explains that the flexibility and adaptability of the plan was crucial during the H1N1
emergency response:
It influenced it to an extent, but since this was a novel virus at the time, you had to
be able to adapt and change what worked and what didn’t. I would say our use of
pandemic planning was fluid – we used the basic outline, but then adapted it to
the situation and the new challenges.
The flexibility of the plans allowed response structure and emergency risk
communication messages to be adapted to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak or any
emergency as needed.
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Charles reveals how the flexibility of the plans allowed his health department to adapt as
needed to the evolving situation; the emphasis of adaptability rather than rigidity within
his organization provided an environment in which social structures could be adapted as
needed.
This section provided description and analysis of how PIOs used basic plans
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. PIOs in New Jersey, Kentucky and California
reported having basic plans that afforded them to the ability to adapt pre-developed
materials as needed. In addition to develop basic plans, PIOs either had no plans or
worst-case scenario plans. These types of plans lacked the permeability of basic plans
and did not support the PIOs emergency response efforts during the 2009-2010 H1N1
outbreak. PIOs usually disregarded the plan altogether and did they best they could with
having a pre-established plan, policy or procedure. These types of plans are considered
explicit structures that constrain emergency risk communication. The following section
provides a general macro description and analysis of explicit organizational structures
that constrained emergency risk communication efforts.
Explicit structures that constrained emergency risk communication efforts
In contrast to having basic plans, some health departments had either no plans or
created worst-case scenario plans. These categories of emergency response plans lack
permeability, or looseness, meaning that PIOs were unable to adapt the plan to the
evolving 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. The following sections provide a macro description
and analysis of the data related to explicit structures that constrain emergency risk
communication efforts.
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No plans that constrained emergency risk communication.
Based on participants’ stories and examples generated during the interviews, in
some cases, health departments didn’t have an emergency risk communication plan. Most
notably, PIOs in Kentucky reported having no plans in place prior to the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak. As a result, some PIOs developed procedures during the H1N1 outbreak.
Ron, a training coordinator in Kentucky, explained:
I would have to say that beyond naming me as a PIO, we don’t have much of a
plan as far as public information goes. We don’t have a written risk
communication or public information plan other than just a very basic amount of
information. The public information officer can develop messages, public health
director approves those messages, and if anyone is approached by the media, they
need to run that through me and then the director before they release anything.
That’s pretty much our plan. And that’s about all of it. I think it needs to be much
more involved.
Ron reveals that his health department developed processes of releasing information.
However, the processes were not written down and as a result, Ron was producing his
own emergency response plan and policies during the emergency response. He did not
produce the plan based upon guidance from the state or CDC. Instead of being able to
adapt previously constructed emergency response structures to the evolving situation,
PIOs without any guidance began developing emergency procedures based upon the
external environmental inputs. For example, a flood of media calls or public inquiries can
prompt emergency response agency to develop crisis communication plans to deal with
the heightened information demands. Unlike the PIOs in other states mentioned in the
previous section on basic emergency response plans, Ron did not have any pre-developed
materials or templates available to information his emergency risk communication
efforts.
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Joe, who primarily serves as a health director in Kentucky, explained that his
department didn’t have an established communications plan prior to H1N1. When asked
if he would develop a communication plan after going through H1N1:
In light of what happened with H1N1, I don’t think it would be useful, no. Other
than developing a plan to identify the people that would need to be contacted,
which is basically part of the pandemic planning, having the phone numbers ready
for the local newspaper, the email addresses, and for the TV and the EMS which
we do as part of our pandemic planning. I don’t think we could have planned on
how we were going to communicate this out not knowing what the status of the
pandemic was, when we were going to get vaccine.
As described in the previous section on basic plans, contact lists and SOPs are
components of an emergency risk communication, but some information should be
tailored to fit the needs of the community. However, not developing an emergency risk
communication plans even after participating in the 2009-2010 H1N1 response reveals a
lack of basic understanding about emergency risk communication and emergency
response activities. Joe’s comments also reveal a lack of understanding about basic risk
communication principles. While information about the emergency event will change,
CDC’s CERC recommends developing templates for inclusion in the emergency risk
communication plan. While having a template pre-developed, event specific information
can be added in during the emergency.
Bill, who primarily serves as the Health Director in Kentucky, also has misgivings
about developing a formal emergency risk communication plan:
We’re a rural small town health department and really wouldn’t have much of a
need for that [a communication plan] as we have two media outlets for our county
where our people would turn to, so a formal plan would be taking a
sledgehammer to a fly.
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Bill has a negative perception of emergency risk communication plans, but his perception
could be based on two reasons. First, Bill could have a lack of understanding about
emergency risk communication principles and not understand the importance of
developing such policies and protocols prior to an emergency.
Second, Bill could have a lack of understanding about the scalability of
emergency response structures. The systems of ICS and NIMS allow for emergency
response structures to be scaled up and down for large and small events. Like with basic
emergency response plans, pre-developed materials can be adapted to fit the evolving
emergency as needed. Having no materials limits ability of the PIO to facilitate
emergency risk communication efforts. Instead of simply adapting pre-developed
materials, the PIO spends his or her time developing new materials during the onset of
the emergency. The first twenty hours of an emergency are critical for disseminating
emergency risk communication (CERC, 2002), so having pre-developed materials
alleviated undue on the PIO to produce information in the heat of the moment.
Overall, the lack of emergency plans was most notably found in Kentucky. The
PIOs in the other three states reported having either basic response plans or worst-case
scenario plans. Based on the examples provided above, some PIOs still lack
understanding of basic emergency risk communication principles and are unsure how to
create an emergency communication plan. As a result, they forgo creating any plan and
develop something during the onset of an emergency. Additionally, not having any predeveloped materials requires the PIO to spend time developing information rather than
simply adapting information to the emergency context. In addition either having a basic
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no or no plan, some PIOs had developed worst-case scenario emergency response plans,
which contained no permeability. Often times, PIOs would completely disregard these
types of plans and develop new plans during the response. The next section provides a
general macro description and analysis of worst-case scenario plans as explicit structures
that constrain emergency risk communication efforts.
Worst-case scenario plans that constrained emergency risk communication.
Based on participants’ stories and examples generated during the interviews,
some PIOs developed what they described as worst-case scenario plans. PIOs in North
Dakota and Kentucky reported creating worst-case scenario plans. These plans were
created based upon emergency planning assumptions derived from a severe 1918-like
pandemic. As a result, these specific emergency planning assumptions dictated how PIOs
created their emergency response plans. By adhering to emergency planning assumptions
based upon a severe 1919-like pandemic, the PIOs inadvertently created plans that lacked
permeability and, unfortunately, the plans could not be adapted for use during the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak. Often the plan was not used at all. This section describes health
departments that had worst-case scenario plans in place prior to the 2009-2010 H1N1
outbreak.
Deb, who primarily serves as an emergency preparedness coordinator in
Kentucky, reveals how her preconceived notions impacted how her department began
responding: “I think that the pandemic flu planning that we had done had sort of prepared
us for the worst case scenario so obviously when this hit we just jumped into it with a
worst case scenario idea.”
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Here Deb’s preconceived notions about what could happened ultimately guided
how her health department would response. Despite the reality of the situation not being
as severe as health experts had anticipated, emergency response structures developed for
a severe pandemic influenza were used to response to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Deb’s worst case scenario plan was not permeability and was difficult for her to adapt to
the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Brenda, another PIO based in Kentucky, had a similar perspective:
Our response happened completely different than what we planned for. We
planned for worst case scenario; people are dying in the streets, the hospitals
overflowing, and it’s just mass chaos.
She added,
When all of our past planning has been based on we will get you and your
immediate family any prophylaxis. We were planning for antibiotics and things
like that—there’s been an attack. Everyone’s at risk but where we had to snip it
back and do priority groups—everything we told everyone just fell apart at the
last minute and we changed the game plan so everyone was upset.
The ability to adapt during an emergency response is critical. Not only had Brenda
developed a worst-case scenario plan, she also assumed her health department would
have a ready supply of vaccine. Relying upon preconceived notions or making
assumptions about what could happen will impact how PIOs enact emergency response
procedures. This strict adherence to emergency planning assumptions ultimately
impacted how her health department handled the response because those planning
assumptions did not hold true during the actual emergency.
As Brenda reveals in her comments, “everything we told everyone just fell apart
at the last minute” and “we changed the game plan, so everyone was upset.” Although
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Brenda and her health department had exercised and planned for a ready supply of
vaccine, the worst-case scenario plan constrained emergency risk communication efforts.
Here Brenda’s attempts to adapt the worst-case scenario plan did not work. As she stated
everything “just fell apart.” Brenda’s comments offer evidence to suggest that the lack of
permeability in the worst-case scenario plans constrained emergency risk communication
efforts.
Joe, a health department director in Kentucky offered this perspective, explicitly
states how his department’s worst case scenario plan did not help their response.
I don’t think our pandemic plan helped during this response. It was worst-case
scenario. Our pandemic plan assumed a ready supply that we were going to get
our vaccine we were going to have it and it assumed a mass vaccination clinic
where we would have a drive through where people would come and neither of
those happened.
Here again the lack of permeability in emergency response structures hindered how PIOs
facilitated emergency risk communication efforts. Again, like Brenda, Joe assumed for a
ready supply of vaccine, which was not available during the 2009-2010 H1N1 response.
The worst case scenario plans were not beneficial to PIOs because too many assumptions
were made prior to the outbreak occurring.
The lack of permeability in the plans constrained emergency risk communication
efforts because PIOs were unable to adapted pre-developed materials to the evolving
emergency. In addition to emergency plans, public health departments also have policies
and procedures that also constrain emergency risk communication efforts.
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Within some emergency plans, PIOs created policies and procedures for implementing
the emergency response structures of NIMS and ICS. Although these structures were
developed to facilitate information flow during an emergency, this study has evidence on
how NIMS and ICS constrained emergency risk communication efforts.
NIMS and ICS structures that constrained emergency risk communication.
As the previous section described, participant interviews revealed three different
categories of emergency response plans: basic plans, no plans and worst-case scenario
plans. The permeability, or looseness, of these plans often impacted how PIOs
implemented the plans during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. This section provides a
general macro analysis and description of how the emergency response structures of
NIMS and ICS constrained emergency risk communication efforts. Permeability is also a
factor in implementing these emergency response structures.
Based upon participants’ stories and examples generated during the interview
process, most in all four states PIOs recall establishing the Incident Command Structure
(ICS). For example, Larry and Gracie, PIOs based in Kentucky, recalled using NIMS
and ICS to establish the following emergency response roles: the Incident Commander,
Medical Liaison, Planning Chief, Financial Officer, and Logistics Officer. In addition to
establishing command and control functions, NIMS and ICS are established the Joint
Information Center (JIC) and the Joint Information System (JIS), which are structures
and systems designed to organize public information efforts by coordinating messages
across multiple response agencies. During the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, some PIOs
implemented the structures the best they could for their local response agencies.
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For example, Mary, a California PIO based at an integrated health system,
explained that her health system fully understands NIMS, but they did not activate their
Department’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC). Mary explained that the severity of
the outbreak did not warrant opening the DEOC. As a result, there was no formal process
of sharing information across multiple agencies. Since the JIC and JIS are explicit
structures designed to coordinate information sharing, this lack of implementation of
these systems constrained emergency risk communication for Mary’s health system. In
contrast to the lack of implementation, of JIC a New Jersey PIO had a different problem
with NIMS and ICS.
David, a PIO based at the state health department in New Jersey, remembers
enacting specific procedures around the Incident Command System during the H1N1
outbreak:
[In] the first three weeks, when we actually stood up the response and we went
into a straight ICS response, I was the lead PIO and reported directly to the
Incident Commander who was our Deputy Commissioner. We wanted our
commissioner free to set up and deal with the things and talk to the governor’s
office and what not. The Director of the Communications, which is interesting
because, I’m not—I don’t really report to her as a dotted line, but now I’m in
charge of the communications so it was a little interesting. But we worked it all
out. Every morning her and I met and we said alright, you know, I had the
director just be in charge of message triage or media triage rather. I ended up
writing most of the messages and we had other people monitoring the media.

David’s example highlights the complexities of the role of communication officers in
New Jersey. As previously described, many of the New Jersey PIOs and HERCs often
engage in day-to-day responsibilities that are different than emergency responsibilities.
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However, when LPHD enact emergency response structures such as the Incident
Command Structure, then day-to-day actions are impacted and are often changed to
accommodate the emergency response. David’s comments reveal that he becomes a
supervisor to one his supervisors during an emergency response.
Public health staff working in non-emergency response positions on a daily basis
ought to receive briefings prior to enacting emergency response structures in order to best
understand how to perform their emergency roles. Here ICS and NIMS constrains the
emergency risk communication process because it is implementing a new structure that is
different from the health department daily reporting mechanism. In some organizations to
subjugate a superior would cause internal struggles hence constraining the emergency
risk communication process.
NIMS and ICS outline command and control functions, but also suggest response
agencies establish a center to coordination information, or a JIC. Sharon, who has worked
in public health for two years for California, explained that setting up the Joint
Information Center (JIC) for the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak “did not blend into our
county for a public health emergency, it was foreign.” Despite the structure unfamiliarity,
Sharon acknowledged that having a formal system, albeit unknown and unfamiliar, did
help organize and ensure that “certain players that were going to be involved in the
response were at the table.” In this regard, NIMS and ICS held organizational members
accountable for their emergency risk communication activities. While Sharon’s
comments provide some evidence that NIMS and ICS facilitated emergency risk
communication by holding some “players” accountable for their participation in the
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response, the unfamiliarity of the response constrained emergency risk communication
efforts. Additionally, if the JIC and JIS are not exercised prior to an actual incident,
setting up and functioning in these emergency response structures can be difficult.
Other PIOs considered establishing a JIC, but then decided against it. Karen, a
PIO based in Kentucky, remembers,
We talked about it a couple of times because we were afraid that our call volume
from the public was getting too high. So we were on the verge of activating the
JIC so we could use those phone banks. We did bring together communications
representatives from the public school systems in the county, and the county PIO,
and someone from city government to do a press conference related to H1N1
fairly early on.
In an effort to coordinate communication efforts, Karen invited other organizations to
participate in a press conference the health department was sponsoring. While the press
conference was a one-time event, activating a JIC for an emergency response is usually a
long-term strategy pending a long emergency response period.
Besides challenges with setting up and using a JIC, there were other issues with
implementing ICS and NIMS. Pamela, a California PIO based at a county health
department, explained how public health staff had trouble reporting to a new supervisor
based on the ICS procedures. Staff would continue to report to their day-to-day
supervisor instead of their supervisor as outlined by the ICS functions. The unfamiliarity
of the emergency response structures hindered how organizational members interacted
with each other. Barbara, who is also based in California, had a similar experience to
Pamela. Her staff had trouble adapting to their emergency response roles:
It’s very difficult to step out of our daily roles and into our ICS roles quickly. You
know we tend to go back to our default, which is what we show up to do at work
every day. There was one other communication challenge that we faced. We
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learned about midway through the incident that we were not doing a good job of
our internal staff communications. So the staff that were not directly involved in
the response didn’t necessarily weren’t necessarily regularly updated on what was
happening.
Barbara mentions two issues related to the emergency communication and emergency
response structures. First, public health staff were unsure of their ICS roles, and second,
non-emergency response staff did not receive updates on the emergency response.
Emergency response drills and exercises often help public health staff become more
familiar with their emergency roles. Real life incidents are another way for staff to enact
ICS roles. The second issue related to internal communication is a common problem
during emergencies. As public external information becomes the main focus on the
response, emergency response personnel take for granted that all staff members are aware
of response updates. Providing situational awareness reports and brief daily reports to all
staff would rectify this issue.
Summary
Analysis of the first research question is provided using a micro-level within-state
analysis. Emergency response plans, policies and procedures took the form of explicit
structures that both constrained and facilitated emergency risk communication. This
study reveals that emergency response plans in all four states included in this study had
varying degrees of permeability. The study’s key finding for the first research question
rests on the permeability of the emergency response plans generated prior to the onset of
an emergency.
The concept of permeability thus reveals how emergency response plans can
facilitated emergency risk communication, as with basic plans, or constrain emergency
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risk communication, as demonstrated by no plans and worst-case scenario plans. The
more permeability in the plan, the more ability the PIO had to adapt the plan to the
evolving emergency. Emergency plans took three distinct forms in North Dakota,
Kentucky, New Jersey and California: basic plans, no plans, or worst-case scenario plans.
Basic emergency response plans facilitate emergency risk communication because
the permeability of basic plans allowed PIOs to adapt the emergency response structures
as needed. PIOs in Kentucky, California, and New Jersey reported having basic response
plans. Basic plans were developed based on guidance provided by state health
departments and the CDC. As a result, PIOs that developed basic plans included predeveloped message templates, SOPs for creating and releasing emergency information,
contact lists, and fact sheets. Although it is not possible to pre-develop specific
communication materials for each potential emergency, including templates in an
emergency response plan gives PIOs the ability to quickly develop emergency risk
communication messages as needed. PIOs dubbed basic emergency response plans
“living documents” indicating that the document can grow, change, and adapt to the
external conditions as needed. This nomenclature reveals how emergency response plans
change as needed. In contrast, no plans and worst-case scenario plans lacked permeability
thus constraining the PIOs’ emergency risk communication efforts. For example, many
PIOs who developed worst-case scenario plans assumed a ready supply of vaccine. As
the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak revealed, that planning assumption did not hold true.
PIOs in North Dakota, New Jersey and California reported creating worst-case
scenario plans and ended up not using the plans during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak,
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because the plans were created for a severe pandemic. In contrast to the other three states
having some form of a plan, many Kentucky PIOs did not have any pre-established or
formally written emergency risk communication plans. As a result, during the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak, Kentucky PIOs developed emergency response plans that focused on
how to release emergency information. As a result, those plans focused more on the how
of public information, the process of releasing information, rather than the what, the
emergency risk communication messages. Even post-H1N1, some Kentucky PIOs
reported they would not create emergency risk communication plans. This unwillingness
to create basic response plans is likely due to a lack of basic risk communication
knowledge. Best practice research in risk communication advocates for the continually
updating and evaluating of emergency plans (Seeger, 2005). Previous risk and crisis
research revealed that creating emergency plans in advance are beneficial to emergency
response agencies, and as this study reveals, the key for PIOs is to develop emergency
plans with permeability to allow them to adapt the plans to evolving emergency.
In addition to the explicit structure of emergency response plans, NIMS and ICS
are the second form of explicit structures that constrain emergency risk communication
efforts. NIMS and ICS are explicit structures because they are written and are regarded as
policy with the health department. Although designed to be scalable for large and small
events, PIOs in all four states reported how NIMS and ICS constrained emergency risk
communication efforts. Like the emergency response plans, these structures need
permeability in order for PIOs to adapt them to emergency conditions.
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NIMS and ICS outline how a PIO should implement the JIC and the JIS. Both
structures were designed to support emergency risk communication efforts between and
among several first responder organizations. For example, when a LPHD implements a
JIC, representatives from organizations and agencies involved in the response send a
communication officer to physically represent their organization or agency. In turn, that
communication officer assists the lead responding agency with communication
messaging, short and long-term communication strategy, and consistent messaging to
multiple audiences. Unfortunately, first responder organizations and agencies might not
have their own communication officer. As a result, the JIC may not have enough staff to
warrant its existence.
New Jersey and California PIOs reported implementing JICs during the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak. PIOs found the JIC and JIS structures to constrain emergency risk
communication efforts because their public health staff was not familiar with NIMS and
ICS. PIOs in California reported that public health staff did not understand how enacting
NIMS and ICS changed their normal day-to-day functions. For example, during an
emergency public health staff enact specific emergency response roles, which require
them to report to individuals who are not their daily supervisors. Since the new reporting
structure was unfamiliar, staff would report to their normal supervisor.
In conclusion, several organizational structures have been identified that facilitate
and constrain emergency risk communication. The study’s key finding for the first
research question rests on the permeability of the emergency response plans generated
prior to the onset of an emergency.
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Basic plans were explicit organizations that facilitated emergency risk communication.
No plans, worst-case scenario plans and emergency response structures NIMS and ICS
constrained emergency risk communication efforts. The first research question focused
on organizational structures that facilitate and constrain emergency risk communication.
The second research question focused on the role of the PIO. The next section provides
the an analysis of interview data related to the second research question.
Research Question Two: How do implicit and explicit structures impact the
enactment of the PIO role and are they different or similar depending upon the state
in which the individual is located?
The results and analysis of the second research question are related to agent (e.g.,
implicit and explicit structures of the PIO role) and focus on interview responses related
PIOs’ job responsibilities, other job expectations created for them by their work
colleagues and organizational structures of each state’s health departments. Based upon
the data generated in the interviews and using the sensitizing concept of agent, including
the subconcepts of expected modes of conduct and setting, the author looked for how the
concept of agent manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts. For example, the author
classified PIOs’ additional job expectations—those that were not included in the PIOs’
job description—as implicit structures because those additional expectations were upheld
as an unwritten rule within the health department and represent expected modes of
conduct for that individual. As a result, PIOs were expected to conduct certain functions
based upon implied structures created by their colleagues. Additionally, the organization
of the public health systems, or the setting, in each state contributed to how PIOs enacted
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their roles in the areas of emergency planning and response. The organization of health
systems provide explicit structures since they are written and used as local government
policy. In order to answer the second research question, a general macro description and
analysis of implicit structures of the PIO role will be provided. Then a general macro
description and analysis of explicit structures of the PIO role will be provided. Finally, a
micro within-state analysis is provided in the section summary. The following section
provides a macro description and analysis of implicit structures of the PIO role.
Implicit structures of the PIO role.
As public health staff interact with each other in emergency planning activities or
other daily activities, those social interactions often determine the tasks and
responsibilities the PIO role should conduct. Those social interactions form implicit
structures which often dictate how PIOs enact their emergency planning activities. The
theoretical concept of agent and expected modes of conduct reveal how implicit
structures form. This study reveals how two expected modes of conduct for local public
health PIOs: 1). balancing multiple roles and 2). conducting media relations. Expected
modes of conduct are formulated through social interactions between organizational
members and often create organizational expectations for how the PIO role is enacted
within the health department.
Across all four states, PIOs serving in multiple roles faced challenges of
prioritizing work responsibilities, completing tasks as needed, managing the uncertainty
of the outbreak, and working with limited staff resources. In addition to balancing
multiple roles, PIOs conducted media relations activities. Across all four states PIOs
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explained that media relations activities included coordinating messaging with local
stakeholders, disseminating information to multiple publics, and following guidance
provided by non-local entities such as the state health department and CDC. The
following paragraphs provide examples of the similarities of implicit structures of the
PIO role.
Similarities of implicit structures of the PIO role.
There are two similarities of the implicit structure of the PIO role. The first
similarity is the expectation of the PIO to balance multiple roles during an emergency
response. The second similarity is to conduct media relations activities during an
emergency. This section will provide more detail on how these implicit structures of the
PIO role were similar across the four states included in this study.
The first similarity of the implicit structures of the PIO role is the expectation to
balance multiple roles during an emergency. Alice primarily serves as the Branch
Manager for Health Information for a county health department in Kentucky and has
worked in her position at a district health department for less than five years. She
explains that enacting the role of a PIO during emergencies is difficult as many do not
understand the role:
I think this is the problem for everybody. Public information unfortunately is one
hat of the multiple hats that people wear in their organization and a lot of times
they don’t even know what a public information officer is— like what they’re
supposed to be doing. And it’s kind of the same here. I mean when I started I was
told I was the public information officer and I’m like ‘What is that?’ So I had to
research it and I’ve been trained and now I feel comfortable with that and it is a
part of my daily routine because my branch handles all public relations for our
agency.
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Alice reveals that initially she was uncertain about how to enact the role of a PIO. She
was not clear about the expected modes of conduct she would be called upon to perform.
It is not uncommon for public health staff to misunderstand the role of a PIO. Here the
absence of social interaction required Alice to look outside her health department to
better understand the role of the PIO. She did her own research about the role and
received training. The individual designated to serve in an emergency role ought to have
the proper training to carry out such a critical role. One of the many functional
responsibilities of a PIO is to disseminate accurate information to a variety of audiences
who can then make informed decisions about protecting themselves from harm. For
example, during the 2011 Japan nuclear power plant disaster, the Japanese government
and US Embassy in Japan advised people to shelter-in-place to protect themselves.
While Alice was proactive and conducted her own basic background research
about the functions of PIOs, health directors and emergency preparedness staff should
work to ensure the designated PIO has the training and knowledge to enact emergency
risk communication principles when needed. Further, health directors and emergency
preparedness staff should also be trained in emergency risk communication since there
social interactions with PIOs result in implicit structures that dictate the PIO’s job duties.
For example, participating in the CDC’s Pandemic Influenza CERC training
would have provided Alice (and her colleagues) with specific skills to enact emergency
risk communication. Alice’s comments reveal how the interactions between
organizational members revealed a lack of understanding of the PIO role. As a result,
there were not clear expected modes of conduct for her to enact the role. In contrast,
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social interactions between public health staff in a different health department in
Kentucky played a major role in the enactment of the PIO role. Often times due to small
staffs and decreasing budgets, PIOs often work in one or two additional positions without
additional compensation. For example, Ron, who serves primarily as the training
coordinator in Kentucky, said,
And if I was a dedicated PIO I mean if that’s all that I had to do it would have
been easy enough but it was just a small part of what I had to do during this. I
didn’t have time to do all that is what it boiled down to.
Here Ron reveals that time was a major factor for him as he enacted the role of
PIO. Like many other non-communication staff serving as the PIO during an emergency,
his expected mode of conduct was to complete two fulltime positions. As a result, he was
not able to perform PIO duties to the fullest extent because he had other job
responsibilities to conduct. Karen, who works primarily as the administrative services
manager in Kentucky, recalls struggling to balance her day-to-day administrative duties
with her emergency PIO responsibility:
So when we organized into ICS, I was supposed to be PIO and that was it. I
would get so uptight about having to relinquish all control of the planning and
scheduling for clerical support. Once we really kind of really got into it and
started the school located vaccination clinics, I was needed as a someone to
provide clerical support…. So carrying those two assignments I think that was
when the germs started in the public health director’s mind that if he could do it,
he might need to be moving me to a full time communications assignment which
is has in fact just happened.
Karen’s example demonstrates the frustration of balancing two completely different roles
and reveals competing expected modes of conduct. While organizational emergency
policies mandate that Karen serve only as the PIO, her personal expected modes of
conduct regarding her day-to-day job caused her to take on more job responsibilities than
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she could handle. Fortunately, post-H1N1, she moved into a full-time communications
position and no longer has to balance multiple roles. To capitalize on their community
relationships, some Kentucky health departments designate health educators as
emergency response PIOs. During non-emergency times, health educators focus their
efforts on a variety of health promotion programs such as physical fitness, tobacco
cessation, and safer sexual practices.
As health educators, these individuals often work in the community educating the
public about health issues and establish a number of community relationships. During an
emergency, the expected mode of conduct for health educators serving as PIOs is to
disseminate information to community stakeholders. Marie works primarily as a health
educator at a single county health department and worked in this role for more than ten
years. She wishes she had more time to be involved with emergency preparedness
activities, but her regular day-to-day responsibilities as a health educator make it
increasingly difficult:
We’re a small health dept and I do anything that has to do with community
education. That’s my job. Whether its teaching nutrition to kids, tobacco,
diabetes, you name it that’s my responsibility and I want to be kept up to date, but
I don’t want to have to attend meetings that don’t really have to do with me. Does
that make sense? Because I really don’t have time.

Like many others mentioned above, Marie too signals with the lack of time
available to complete normal day-to-day duties as a health educator and participate in
emergency planning activities. Although she is absence from planning activities, she is
expected to provide emergency response support. Emergency response support activities
for PIOs include information gathering, verifying and disseminating information. In
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addition to emergency response, PIOs also have functional responsibilities during nonemergency times including developing media campaigns related to emergency
preparedness and testing new emergency protocols. Susan serves primarily as a health
educator for a district health department in Kentucky and has served in this role for more
than ten years. She explained the role of a health educator as the PIO during an
emergency is important because of the relationships she already has established in the
community, and during an emergency “we just have to jump in and do the PIO part.”
Pam, yet another health educator, explained that during H1N1, she was responsible for
disseminating the information to local businesses, day care centers, physicians’ offices,
and other local stakeholders. Again, both of these health educators are able to use the
relationships they developed during their daily work responsibilities to dissemination
emergency risk communication.
Rosie, who serves primarily as the public health director, but previously as the
Director of Health Education, offers a unique insight into a new expected mode of
interaction for those serving as health educators during non-emergency times. Health
educators play an important role in educating the public on a day-to-day basis and often
have well-established relationships with many different community partners:
I think the role of health educator and PIO kind of go hand in hand, because your
health educator focuses on promoting health and educating people. And when
H1N1 came along, or any kind of outbreak, or any kind that requires emergency
response, or information dissemination, I think it’s your health educator who
helps you with flyers, who helps you with, you know, delivering that information
at a level that, you know, you’re entire community could understand and relate to.
Local public health departments (LPHDs) in Kentucky capitalized on those relationships
by placing health educators in the emergency PIO role. Unfortunately, other public health
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staff will continue to deal with the pressures of conducting two full-time positions during
emergencies. Despite being tasked with multiple roles, two California PIOs revealed how
the expected modes of conduct for public health motivated them to complete their tasks.
Pamela, who primarily serves as the Director of Health Education for a single county
health department in California, explained:
We look at it like more of the challenge—as kind of fun rather than ohmigod
(laughter). We don’t tolerate whiners in our unit (laughter). I mean because
otherwise I mean that’s kind of what public health is--because you’re always
going to have issues going on and you’ve gotta be able to have the capacity and
the interest in trying to make that impact that somehow. Otherwise, all you’re
going to do is sit there and be a pencil pusher at your desk, which generally isn’t
going to help anybody.
Here Pamela’s comments reveal the realities of working in a public health
organization, and also the expectations of public health staff. Within her health
department, the expected modes of conduct center around “capacity” and “interest” to
make an impact within the community. Another county health department PIO in
California, Diane also commented, “We did the very best we could and went above and
beyond for what it is we had to do, because we felt like there was no choice you rise to
the occasion to protect the public.”
Pamela and Diane’s experiences and their reactions are not uncommon. Their
personal and professional resiliency is testament to the types of individuals who serve in
emergency response professions, but also representative of a public health professional.
For Pamela and Diane enacting the PIO role focused on completing the task in order to
protect the public during an emergency. The second similarity of the implicit structures
that impact the PIO role is the expectation to conduct media relations. In addition to
86

serving in multiple roles, conducting media relations is the second expected mode of
conduct for PIOs. This study reveals there is an overlap between balancing multiple roles
and conducting media relations activities. The following examples show how the two
expected modes of conduct are not mutually exclusive. Ken, who serves primarily as the
public health director for a district health department, explained that most often he
enacted the role of a PIO:
Because we’re somewhat smaller agency I sort of wear two hats. One is the public
health director and as the public information officer so most of the time I take that
role. Occasionally the nursing director will also be stepping up into that role.
Sometimes it depends on the nature of the inquiry. If it takes more of an approach
towards clinical questions, the disease itself, or those kinds of things, because I’m
not a clinician we would direct those things to her. If it’s more of a policy
question or just kind of strategic how we’re handling the overall operation, that
kind of thing that’s where I would step into the role.
Here the expected mode of conduct impacts how Ken functions in the role of PIO. Ken’s
explanation of the PIO role is actually the description for a subject matter expert and a
spokesperson. Often organizational members assume there is no difference between a
PIO and spokesperson, but there are distinct differences. PIOs engage in information
gathering, media relations and message dissemination; spokespersons are often subject
matter experts or designated officials who publicly represent the agency. The
spokesperson role often requires the individual to spend a significant amount of time
interacting with the media, often on television.
When asked how she balanced the roles of PIO, emergency response coordinator,
and interim public health director during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, Sandra, a North
Dakota PIO based on a rural health department, replied, “I was busy. [laughter] I took
responsibility. I took all of the media and all of the press stuff, you know, the written
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work. I would put my designee in front of the camera.” Sandra’s comments reveal that
she did not personally conduct media interviews, but rather she had a “designee” to assist.
Within this context, the expected mode of conduct for the PIO role was coordinate media
relations activities. Unlike PIOs in Kentucky, Sandra’s enactment of the PIO role is one
of coordinating media activities, not serving as the department’s spokesperson.
Jim, who primarily serves as the health director for a single county health
department in Kentucky, describes the expected mode of conduct for the PIO role as
working with the media:
Everybody had their expertise area, and I had a lot of contact with the media.
Nobody else wanted to talk to the media. So that was my job to make the
information was disseminated and talk to and do interviews and to talk to
reporters.
Jim’s comments reveal that no other organizational member wanted to talk to the media,
so it was expected of him to conduct media relations activities. Additionally, based upon
social interactions with other organizational members Jim learned that other staff had
predetermined expertise areas. Almost by default Jim is designated the emergency PIO.
Some health directors feel strongly that they should be the ones in front of the cameras
and serving as the face of the health department.
This section described how public health staff enacted the role of a PIO during the
2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak based on expected modes of contact created through social
interactions between organizational members. This section revealed two similarities of
implicit structures that impact the PIO role.
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The two similarities are balancing multiple roles and conducting media activities.
The following section describes how explicit structures of the setting, or type of health
department, impacted the enactment of the PIO role. This section highlights the
differences across the four states included in this study.
Explicit structures of the PIO role.
The type of health department, or setting, takes the form of an explicit structure
and dictates the involvement of the PIO in emergency planning and response activities.
PIOs in New Jersey, North Dakota and California had the most relevant examples of
evidence revealing how the organizational setting of a health department impacts the
enactment of the PIO role. Most notably, New Jersey’s health system and organization of
LINCS agencies dictates emergency risk communication efforts. Although Kentucky’s
public health system is divided into single county health department or district health
departments, the study did not generate data that revealed how the setting of the health
departments in the state related to the enactment of the PIO role. Descriptive examples of
how the explicit structures of the setting, or type of health department, is related to the
enactment of the PIO role will be provided in the following paragraphs. These explicit
structures highlight the differences in the explicit structures of the PIO role across the
four states included in this study.
Differences in the explicit structures of the PIO role.
The difference in the public health setting was most noticeable in New Jersey,
which has 112 local health departments and 22 of those local public health departments
(LPHDs) are designated as LINCS agencies. The LINCS agencies often have a
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communication officer to assist with emergency preparedness activities. This
individual—titled the health educator risk communicator or HERC—focuses on public
health education efforts in their respective communities. The HERC role is distinct from
the PIO, which is commonly found in the other three states included in this study. The
HERC is often not designated as emergency response PIO for the health department like
in Kentucky, North Dakota and California. Instead, the PIO, who handles communication
activities for the entire health department and is also often located in a different building
than the HERC, is the lead emergency response PIO
Melissa, who work has worked a HERC for fewer than five years for a county
health department in New Jersey, explained the differences between PIOs and HERCs:
“I’m more outreach, community outreach and presentations, that’s what I do more of than
the PIO. The PIO strictly writes the press releases—information out to the public; I’m
more you know I’m out in the community.”
Here the structures of the New Jersey health system formally dictate who
conducts emergency preparedness activities. As Melissa state, the HERC works on
emergency preparedness community outreach and the PIO works on press releases.
California and North Dakota PIOs also work emergency preparedness activities with their
colleagues, but Kentucky PIOs serve as the PIO in a response capacity only.
HERCs often do not serve in the emergency response PIO role either. In some cases,
New Jersey health departments do not staff the PIO position, so the HERC will work with
the PIO affiliated with the county government.
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Although Susan, another HERC from New Jersey, fields media inquiries and
reporters’ phone calls, she is still required to send her press materials to the county PIO
before sending them to the media:
I’ll write the press release but I have to send it to them to be “countified” … and if
I get a call directly from a reporter, technically, I can’t talk to that reporter until
I’ve cleared it with them.
Susan reveals how she does not have the authority to disseminate press releases
on behalf of the health department without first being reviewed by the county PIO. Her
comments describe how the county PIO serves as mediator between the media and the
health department. Having the county PIO “filter” media inquiries and review emergency
risk communication messages creates an added organizational structure that has potential
to constrain the emergency risk communication process. Again, the New Jersey public
health system dictates that HERCs work with the county PIO, who has final authority
regarding the department’s media activities. Unlike Melissa, Susan is more involved with
the media relations activities since her health department does not staff a PIO.
These examples from New Jersey reveal how most HERCs dictated to only serve
as emergency preparedness community outreach. In one case, a HERC conducts more
media relations activities, but did not specify if she worked on emergency response
activities.
In North Dakota, health departments in urban and rural areas impacted the
enactment of the PIO role. There are only 8 PIOs in the state that cover 53 counties,
many of which are in rural areas. The following paragraphs highlight relevant examples
from North Dakota PIOs.
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In a rural county of the state, Sandra, who has served as a PIO for about two
years, revealed two important characteristics about her role as an emergency
communicator: there aren’t many PIOs in her region and those PIOs often do not have
emergency communication expertise. Sandra notes other community partners who often
seek her assistance during emergencies know her expertise in emergency risk
communication:
The only other facility that actually has a PIO is one of our hospitals here. Yeah
nobody else has a PIO and in fact our county emergency manager—if we had
something that was going on countywide and he needed PIO assistance, he’s
going to call here for my help. So we kind of have a very small community and
none of them have that ability. Except for our hospital does have one and when it
comes to writing the plan we collaborate some, but her background is more
marketing, and so when it comes to emergency response, it really kind of goes the
other way. If they need advice or they need help, she calls me.
Here the setting of a rural health department impacts how she enacts the role of a PIO.
Sandra’s comments provide insight about how outside agencies value her position as an
emergency communicator and acknowledge her expertise in that area. Since she is the
only PIO in her community with this expertise, she has been able to cultivate working
relationships with the hospital communications officer and the emergency manager.
Despite the rural location, small staff, and lack of additional PIOs in the region, she is
able to fulfill her responsibilities as PIO and two other public health staff positions,
provide communication assistance to other community partners, and serve as a
emergency communication expert.
In addition to rural and urban setting, the setting of local health department versus
the state health department also impacts the PIO role in North Dakota. During the 20092010 H1N1 outbreak, local health departments were tasked disseminating messages, not
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the creating them. Mark, a North Dakota PIO who has worked in the health department
for four years, highlighted the state’s activities during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Mark revealed the state health department created a specific health communication
campaign about the priority groups:
The state put together a campaign of a few television ads. And the state did [a
campaign] where it just talked about the importance of getting the vaccine, what
the priority groups were, why they were developed. One of them was a woman
who was pregnant talking about why she was getting the H1N1 vaccine. Pregnant
women were very high on the priority list. The state did that.
Mark’s comments highlight that the expected mode of conduct for local public health
PIOs in North Dakota was primarily focused on getting information and vaccine out to
the public. The role of the state health department was to create messages and health
communication campaigns educating the public. Ann, the PIO at the North Dakota state
health department, mentioned developing education materials that were disseminated to
LPHDs, who in turn distributed the materials to various local community partners.
Being at the state health department, Ann had a different expected mode of
conduct that her counterparts at the local level. Ann had the opportunity to provide vital
input for communication strategy and message creation. It is unknown if the local level
PIOs were able to provide any input to the state about the creation of emergency risk
communication messages. Further, because Ann was located at the state health
department, her setting was vastly different from the PIOs at the local level. Due to the
organization of the public health system in the United States, state health departments
often have more overall power than local health departments. In North Dakota, the state
health department often mandated what types of emergency risk communication
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messages were created and disseminated across the state. Again, being situated at the
state health department impacted the enactment of the PIO role. New Jersey and North
Dakota reveal how the settings of health departments in those states were related to the
enactment of the PIO role. For one PIO in California, being situated within an integrated
health system and not an actual health department played a role in how she enacted her
role as a PIO.
Mary, who has served as the Communication Officer last two years in California,
explains that being situated in an integrated health system in California resulted in more
collaboration with other units. The communications unit worked closely with other
departments on pandemic influenza planning specifically related to emergency
communication:
The communications unit and the PIO were very, very involved in this kind of
planning. We have a crisis and emergency risk communication plan and our
whole health system is really committed to working proactively with the media
and we recognize that communications internally and externally was really vital
to any type of planning for pandemic for a pandemic response so we were
involved from the very beginning.
Mary reveals that within the health system in which she is employed, the system valued
the input of the communications unit in pandemic influenza planning. As a result, the
communications unit was heavily involved in the planning process. Since the PIO and the
communications unit was situated in large integrated health system, there were ample inhouse resources available to create emergency risk communication materials. In fact, the
integrated health system received funding as an advanced practice center from the federal
government. Advanced practice centers often developed communication materials that
became resources for other health departments.
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In Kentucky, PIOs were situated in either single county health departments or
district health departments. District health departments serve multiple counties within the
state. PIOs in both single county and district health departments did not provide any
information that suggested the differences in the type of health department impacted the
enactment of the PIO role.
Analysis of interview data related to research question two revealed profound
differences in the setting or the type of health department across the four states included
in this study. The setting or type of health department provides the primary explicit
structures that impact the enactment of the PIO role. Most notably, the setting of the New
Jersey health system creates the HERC role which is not found in the other three states
included in the study.
There were differences in the PIO role for those located in rural health
departments or at the state level. Although single county and district health departments
exist in Kentucky, this study did not yield findings that revealed how those settings
impact the PIO role. One California PIO revealed how being an integrated health system
rather than a county health department impacted her role as a PIO.
Summary
This summary answers the second research question by summarizing key findings
and providing a micro within-state analysis. There are three key findings for the second
research question. First, there are two similarities in how the PIO role is enacted in the
four states included in this study.
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First, all emergency response PIOs are expected to conduct media relations
activities; second, a majority of PIOs are expected to serve in multiple roles during an
emergency response. The third key finding for the second research question focuses on
the differences found in the organization of each state’s health system. The following
paragraphs will provide more detail related to these key findings.
Regarding the PIOs’ similarities, all four states reported challenges of serving in
multiple roles during an emergency response. This was most apparent in Kentucky and
California where individuals serving in non-communication staff positions were
designated as the emergency PIO. Based expectations created by public health staff and
even community agencies, PIOs were expected to competed normal day-to-day
responsibilities in addition to emergency response activities, including enacting the role
of PIO. Many of the individuals serving in the emergency PIO function did not receiving
additional compensation for the additional work, but health department leadership
expected their organizational members to assist as needed for an emergency response. As
a result, the PIO role is designated to already overtaxed individuals who may have
communication background, such as health educators or health education managers, or it
is designated to someone in emergency preparedness and response who does not have
any communication training.
While some PIOs cited benefits to serving multiple roles, including subject matter
expertise and pre-established professional networks, many struggled to prioritize work
responsibilities, complete designated tasks, and manage the uncertainty of the event while
working with limited staff resources. Overtaxed individuals and individuals with no
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communication training are limited in their ability to enact the PIO role to its fullest
potential. The second similarity across the four states focused on emergency response
activities for the PIO. All four states report the enactment of the PIO role to include some
form of media relations. Media relations activities included writing press releases,
coordinating information from federal partners, organizing press conferences, conducting
media interviews, and prepping spokespeople. The enactment of emergency response
activities was also dependent upon the type of emergency response plans that were
created and the involvement of the PIO in emergency planning activities.
As Chapter Four revealed, the basic emergency plans in place prior to the 20092010 had permeability allowing the PIOs to adapt the plan to emerging situation. PIOs
were able to use pre-developed templates, talking points and other communication
materials as they facilitated media relations activities. However, the enactment of the PIO
was often dependent on the emergency plans to guide their actions; so if the plans were
more in depth, the PIO had a more in depth guide. If there was no plan, then PIOs had
foundation to support their emergency response activities. If PIOs had a worst-case
scenario plan, they often discarded that plan and developed new materials.
In addition to these three similarities, there is one major difference in how the PIO
role is enacted across the four states included in this study. This major difference is based
upon the setting or the type of health department where the PIO is located. The explicit
organizational structures of the public health systems across the states dictate the
enactment of the PIO role. Each state included in this study has a different organizational
setting for their public health system. For example, in New Jersey the role that
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coordinates emergency risk communication efforts is dubbed the Health Educator Risk
Communicator (HERC). The HERC position focuses on education and coordination of
emergency preparedness and response activities. HERCs interviewed for this study do not
formally serve as the emergency PIO; instead they assist the health department PIO or
county PIO as needed. There were differences in the PIO role for those located in rural
health departments or at the state level, but there were only a few PIOs that mentioned
those differences. Additionally, although there are single county and district health
departments in Kentucky, this study did not yield findings that revealed how those
settings impact the PIO role. One California PIO revealed how being an integrated health
system rather than a county health department impacted her role as a PIO. Overall, while
it is likely that the organization of the PIO’s health department impacts the role of the
PIO, this study only found strong evidence of this occurring in New Jersey. Whereas the
second research question focused on the role of the PIO, the third research question
focuses on the relationships the developed by the PIO before and during the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak. The next section provides the answers the third research question.
Research Question Three: In what ways are institutionalized processes related to
PIOs’ internal and external partnerships?
The results and analysis for the third research question are related to institutionalized
processes (e.g., working partnerships of emergency preparedness and response) and focus
interview responses related to PIOs’ collaborations with public health staff, community
organizations and national organizations. Based on the data generated in the interviews
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and using the sensitizing concept of institutionalized processes, the author looked for how
the concept of institutionalized processes manifested in the PIOs’ interview transcripts.
For example, during their interviews PIOs described how NIMS and ICS often dictated
the relationships health departments established with other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector during emergencies at the
local and state level. Based upon their descriptions of their relationships, the author
developed a descriptive classification system of the PIOs partnerships. The author created
three classes: internal partnerships, locally-based external partnerships, and nationallybased external partnerships. First, internal partnerships were those found within the PIO’s
health department. Second, locally-based partnerships were those partnerships that were
developed external to the health department. Third, externally-based partnerships were
those that were external to the health department and the state where the PIO was
situated.
In order to answer the third research question, a general macro description and
analysis of institutionalized processes for local internal partnerships will be provided.
Next a general macro description and analysis of institutionalized processes for local
external partnerships will be provided. Then a general macro description and analysis of
institutionalized processes for external national partnerships will be provided. Finally, a
micro within-state analysis is provided in the section summary. The next section provides
a macro description and analysis of institutionalized processes for local internship
partnerships.

99

Institutionalized processes for local internal partnerships.
Previous research using structuration theory (Garner, 2006; Nicotera, 2008;
Witmer, 1997) examines how internal and external relationships are produced and
reproduced through various social interactions of individuals and groups within
organizations. This is relevant to the formation of working relationships between PIOs
and public health staff. As the first section revealed, often times PIOs had limited
involvement in pandemic planning activities. Additionally, Poole and Dobosh (2010)
explain that structures can be generated by the organization, but more often they are
appropriate from existing institutions. Organizational structures already in place within a
health department are likely to dictate the involvement of PIO with other public health.
For example, if a PIO was not previously involved in emergency planning activities prior
to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, then it is likely the PIO would not be involved for
future emergency planning activities.
Based upon participants’ stories and examples generated through interview data,
PIOs reported working with a variety of public health staff including emergency
preparedness staff, epidemiologists, public health directors, health officers, immunization
coordinators, communicable disease control specialists, medical directors, clinical
supervisors, nursing staff, environmental health, home health, bioterrorism and training
coordinators. This study found there was no consistency in which divisions or individuals
PIOs worked with for pandemic planning; often, the emergency preparedness division
and, specifically the preparedness planner, would write all of the emergency response
plans. Depending on the personal working relationship the PIO had with the planner or
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planning division, the more or less involved he or she was in pandemic planning;
however, more often than not, the PIO is solely responsible for any emergency
communication planning. The relationship between the PIO and other staff who are
involved in emergency preparedness is often an organizational constraint developed by
institutionalized processes of that particular organization. For health departments that
responded to many previous emergencies and incidents there was a greater emphasis on
including PIOs in emergency preparedness and response activities. For those local public
health departments (LPHDs) that had less experience, often times public information was
distinctly separate from planning and response activities. Depending upon the
institutional memory of each health department, institutionalized process regarding local
internal working relationships differed.
PIOs included in this study reported varying degrees of working partnerships with
other public health staff. For example, Some PIOs are often directly engaged with their
emergency preparedness division and plan writing. Al, a health director for a single
county health department in Kentucky, provided an example of his interactions with the
emergency preparedness division:
I have been planning activities in all aspects of it from setting PODs with putting
together the information we would be getting out to the public as well as setting
together for the roles of our nurses as well as the other roles within our
organization.
Al’s interaction with the emergency preparedness division focused on both the logistics
of vaccine distribution, but also public information efforts. They worked together to
ensure all public health staff was aware of their role in an emergency response. While Al
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directly interacted with his emergency preparedness division, Marie, who has served as a
health educator for ten years in Kentucky, was less engaged:
My role is to educate the public and to try to prevent any panic and everything
like that. So I don’t know other than maybe if there are changes in the plan to be
more up to date on it because I’m not the emergency planner. [The emergency
planner] goes to all these emergency planning meetings and everything like that
and they’re making changes that they know are necessary, but I might not always
be aware of those changes.
Marie was much less engaged with her planning division because her daily responsibility
is not emergency preparedness, and her department hired “risk planner” whose
responsibility is plan writing. However, Marie did express concerns that in her absence
changes could be made and she would not be notified. In contrast to Marie’s situation,
Helen, who primarily serves as the director of nursing for a single county health
department in Kentucky, is very familiar with emergency preparedness activities:
I’ve been a public information officer for many years before we had preparedness
planners. I did all of that and now we do let her take the lead on things like this
now lots of times if people are coming in and wanting to know the medical aspect
of it or what symptoms are people experiencing I do that but lots of times in the
preparedness and the community preparedness she takes the lead as far as what
can you do to prevent the influenza from you know affecting your family,
affecting your worksite, you know she will do that. I handle more the medical part
of it when people are wanting to know symptoms and those type of things.

Here Helen reveals that her department’s preparedness planner developed relationships
with other hospitals, and as a result, Helen used the planner’s relationships during H1N1,
but she did not mention developing those relationships herself.
The relationship between the PIO and emergency preparedness division is crucial
because if PIOs are to rely upon emergency response plans written by a specific planner,
the PIO ought to have knowledge of what is in those plans and how the emergency
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response procedures are to be enacted. Mark, who primarily serves as an environmental
health specialist for a single county health department in Kentucky, explained his
involvement in planning:
Well I’m involved with a lesser extent because I’m communications but we have
the disaster plan and our disaster coordinator runs that. And that’s their main job
they work with that all the time. And then when it comes to down to
communication they just call me and talk to me about what would be necessary
would they need to do what would we need to do to update it but I don’t through
and update it every two years or something like that.
Again, the relationship between the PIO and the emergency planner is critical. If
communication is included in the emergency response plan, the PIO ought to be included
to share his/her expertise about emergency risk communication. Further, if the PIO is not
included in the planning process and if any changes are made to the plan, the emergency
planner ought to notify the PIO of the changes.
While Kentucky PIOs reported varying degrees of working partnerships within
their health departments, some California PIOs were more involved with their public
health staff. Mary, a PIO based in California, explains how her communications unit
assisted with the pandemic influenza planning:
Our health and emergency response unit which is responsible for the pandemic flu
planning got to be in the same office as us so we worked very very closely with
them. We know them really well they rely on us for a lot of the risk
communication. A lot of back and forth just kind of assisting we helped them a lot
with the plan.
Mary’s team was physically located next to the emergency response unit, and as a result,
the two teams worked closely together on planning and response activities. As the two
teams continue to work together, their social interactions are likely to lead to future
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collaborative activities. The more collaboration the two teams have, the more likely their
interactions will lead to new institutionalized processes for that organization.
Joan, another California PIO based at a county health department, mentioned
working directly with her communicable disease unit; her interactions with them resulted
in developing messages:
I got involved with helping them come up with how do we get the information out
to the public so the public knows who is who we’re going to be, who’s qualified
to get shots, who were the target markets for immunizing and so on. We drafted,
you know, the guidelines, you know, we did the press releases, we set up
interviews with all the media, we kept all of the people that we work with
involved.

Joan directly worked with the communicable disease unit to develop emergency
risk communication messages. The communicable disease unit at her health department
was in charge of responding to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, so they participated in
conference calls with the CDC to receive the most accurate information available. As a
result, the communicable disease unit acted as subject matter experts (SMEs) and
provided Joan with the content she needed to develop emergency risk communication
messages.
For Kentucky and California PIOs, institutionalized processes related to
communication officers working with emergency preparedness units often impacted the
level of involvement the acting PIO had with other public health divisions. The
comments from Kentucky PIOs reveals a disconnect between emergency risk
communication activities and overall activities. In comparison, California PIOs report
working with other internal divisions as needed.
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In addition to using local internal working partnerships for emergency risk
communication efforts, external working relationships were also established between
public health PIOs and other agencies. This section highlighted the institutionalized
processes that impact working relationships PIOs formed with other public health staff.
This study found—across the four states included in this study—there was no consistency
in which divisions or individuals PIOs worked with for pandemic planning; often, the
emergency preparedness division and, specifically the preparedness planner, would write
all of the emergency response plans. The relationship between the PIO and other staff
who are involved in emergency preparedness is often an organizational constraint
developed by institutionalized processes of that particular organization. For health
departments that responded to many previous emergencies and incidents there was a
greater emphasis on including PIOs in emergency preparedness and response activities;
for those local public health departments (LPHDs) that had less experience, often times
public information was distinctly separate from planning and response activities.
The following section describes and analyzes the institutionalized processes of
partnerships with locally-based first responders. Additionally, this section highlights the
partnerships PIO formed with other communication officers within those first responder
organizations.
Institutionalized processes for local external partnerships.
NIMS and ICS strongly encourage first responder organizations to collaborate
with other government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private
sector during emergencies at the local, state and federal level. Here NIMS and ICS take
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the form of institutionalized processes that mandate what types of organizations a health
department should collaborate with during a public health emergency. Often communitywide emergency response exercises, drills, and table-top discussions require PIOs to
attend and participate. During such events, PIOs are able to meet with and interact with
other communication officers. These social interactions, if continued over time, lead to
institutionalized processes that impact how such external partnerships will be used during
an emergency response.
Based on participants’ stories and examples generated by interview data, PIOs in
all four states reportedly worked with other health departments, hospitals, long term care
facilities, first responders, private providers, media outlets, EMS, emergency
management, law enforcement, educational institutions, the mayor’s office, the media,
and county government. Educational institutions, hospitals and private providers were the
reported most frequently as a working partner during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
Some of these working partnerships were already written into the health departments’
emergency response plans. For example, in many of the emergency risk communication
plans, specific protocols were listed about contacting media outlets.
Locally-based external partnerships with other traditional and non-traditional first
responder organizations were often formed based on the recommendations outlined by
NIMS and ICS. As a result, NIMS and ICS were the institutionalized processes that lead
PIOs to work with these types of organizations. Barbara, a county-based PIO in
California, explained that the “partnership that we have with our schools, with tribal
partners, healthcare providers really benefited our ability to spread communication
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messages through those entities.” While working with these local partners, PIOs could
tailor messages for different audiences based upon their needs. For example, Carol,
another California-based PIO, described how different partners had different information
needs. She developed specific communication materials for clinical and non-clinical
audiences in the “health world.” And upon request, the health department would develop
non-medical flyers that physicians could then hand out to her/his patients.
PIOs reported the benefits of working with local external agencies for two main
reasons. First, local external partners helped with disseminating up-to-date information
about the evolving outbreak and availability of vaccines. Second, public health was able
to control the consistency and accuracy of the information provided to the public.
Previous risk and crisis communication studies have focused on organizations that
assist during emergency and crisis responses, but they have failed to analyze the
relationship between the communication officers involved in the response. This study
reveals that often times PIOs develop their own working partnerships to assist with
emergency risk communication efforts. Many of these relationships are established due to
NIMS and ICS requirements, but other times the relationships emerge during the
response. The following section will describe the relationships public health PIOs created
with other PIOs and how these relationships were or were not the function of
institutionalized processes of the health department.
Institutionalized processes when working with other PIOs.
While NIMS and ICS often dictated what organizations PIOs should work with
during public health emergency planning and response activities, some PIOs formed
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working partnerships directly with other communication officers. Often times these
relationships were initially informal social interactions that over time created
institutionalized processes. These institutionalized processes lead PIOs to develop
coalitions or networks to assist with public information efforts during an emergency. This
section will describe the institutionalized processes used when worked with other PIOs
and communication officers.
Many PIOs who participated in this study highlighted the importance of working
PIOs from other agencies. Often PIO-specific working groups are established based to
working relationships developed during emergency trainings and exercises. Additionally,
as first section’s findings revealed, PIOs often balance multiple roles during emergency
responses. Networking with other PIOs ensure, at least, informal and unpaid assistance
from another trained emergency communicator.
Mary, a California PIO, explained:
I participate in a countywide PIO group with all the different agencies. The PIOs
from those groups get together and they know each other and we drill together. So
we already know each other and we know PIOs you know at city agencies you
know at the hospitals in the area and just knowing the and having those
relationships makes it easier for us to disseminate our messages and they’re able
to use our message as well that we’re all of the same page when we’re talking
about a particular health issue like with H1N1. That was really important.
Mary’s comments reveal that due to previous emergency exercises, relationships had
already been established. Social interactions based upon previous engagements created
processes that became institutionalized over time. As a result, during the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak, those pre-developed relationships then created an institutionalized
process for PIOs to work together. Mary explains the benefits of working with other
108

PIOs, because those communication officers and their agencies ultimately extend the
reach of messages, but also ensure consistency of messages. Reaching multiple audiences
with consistent messages are basic tenets of emergency risk communication.
Barbara, another California county PIO, also commented on the importance of
working with fellow PIOs:

We’re a smaller community to its easier for me to know them by name, and I
work with them regularly on other communications efforts. For instance, we have
a mass media campaign we’ve been doing for the last 5 or 6 years on healthy
eating increasing physical activity to families. Because I had those relationships
established it was easy to connect pretty quickly and coordinate messages.

Barbara’s comments reveal that the working partnerships during non-emergency times
provide opportunities for PIOs to get to know each other and develop relationships. As a
result, during emergencies, the other PIOs are ready to assist if needed. Again, these
previously established relationships are the foundation for institutionalized processes that
are enacted during an emergency response.
Diane, who also works as the Director of Heath Education for a health department
in California, also worked with an established PIO group, dubbed the Public Information
Network (PIN):
We had this relationship with the PIN and I had a strong relationship with a lot of
other PIOs so that when I pushed things out to the group, they in turn pushed it
out to their employees—like we talked about and it really helped extend our reach
in a really meaningful way.
For Diane, the PIN group was created out of her drive to bring together communication
officers to train with and support each other. After she formed the group she also served
as President. Although no longer serving in a leadership role, she is still very active with
109

the PIN group. As Diane’s comments reveal, the external partners were able to extend the
reach of the messages, and by using the same materials developed by public health, the
messages stayed consistent within the county. Although most California PIOs describe
the benefits of working with other communication officers, Joan, a California PIO who
works in an urban area, did not work with other public health PIOs:
“You know I was so swamped. I would not have had time to do conference calls. I was
way too busy trying to take care of things here.” Joan has worked in her position for over
a decade and feels confident in her ability to perform her PIO duties without being
directly connected with other PIOs.
In Kentucky, Alice, who works for a district health department in Kentucky, and
Anna, who works for a single county health department, both have established regional
PIO groups. Alice explained:
We have a regional public information officer group that is made up of hospital
PIOs, health department PIOS, police, fire, EMS, emergency management,
schools—the whole spectrum. For the most part it is people that fall under the
public health infrastructure.
PIOs often find that established communication coalitions are extremely
beneficial during emergencies, because they can offer additional resources as needed.
Alice’s comments reveal that most of the agencies involved in the PIO group are from the
public health infrastructure. As a result, this group’s structure is mainly based upon
institutionalized processes of the public health system. As a result, there may be some
agencies that are not currently a part of the group, but should be due to their potential
involvement in an emergency response. Anna, a PIO for a single county health
department, was the former chair of her regional PIO group and, while in a leadership
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position, worked to ensure a strong representation of public health agencies. Anna
explained that the coalition was developed as part of a regional grant project focused on
pandemic influenza. In addition to drills, the PIO group was actively involved in
responding to a large windstorm in September 2008. Again, interactions from previous
emergency response provides a foundation for these relationships to become
institutionalized processes over time. There were many PIOs did not have a coalition
developed prior to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, and some Kentucky PIOs are in the
process of building them now. Rosie, who primarily has served as the health director for
the past five years in Kentucky, explained why she wanted to build a coalition of PIOs:
All of us together who could potentially be in the same group where, you know,
we each have our role in public information. But if we each have our role in
public information—if we only show up at the table in the event of an emergency,
I think there could be that lack of trust or understanding of each other’s position.
So I guess my goal would be some sort of coordination effort to have quarterly
meetings like they do in other emergency preparedness groups to bring together
just public information officers. So that would be my mission to maintain and
build relationships prior to an event happening.
Rosie acknowledges that building relationships prior to an emergency helps build trust
between individuals, but building trust takes time. The development of any working
partnership needs time to develop. As the California PIOs revealed, many of their
established PIO coalitions were based upon relationships generated by working together
during previous emergency exercises. As a result, those social interactions became
institutionalized processes over time. As Kentucky PIOs begin to formulate PIO
coalitions, the process of time and continued social interactions will help institutionalized
those working partnerships as a part of their emergency response plan.
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Ron, who primarily serves as the training coordinator for a health department in
Kentucky is also interesting in building a PIO coalition. He offered this perspective:
What I would like to do is I would like for public information officers within our
four counties, alright, and I’m talking about hospital healthcare spokespersons,
school spokespersons, EM. And I would like to bring that group together and
actually develop a joint information system, you know, to develop a plan for how
our jurisdiction, our multicounty jurisdiction so that there is communication so it
functions like a joint information system is suppose to function.
Here Ron cites ICS and NIMS structures specifically and wants to adhere to already
established emergency protocols to ensure a proper mechanism is in place for the next
major event. While other studies have highlighted organizations assisting with emergency
responses, this study reveals how public health PIOs used institutionalized processes to
establish PIO coalitions. For those PIOs who did not have pre-established working
relationships during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, some are looking for ways to create
new institutionalized processes with other PIOs to ensure working partnerships during an
emergency.
This section revealed institutionalized processes PIOs used when working with
other PIOs. Across all four states, PIOs reported the benefits of working with other
communication officers during the emergency. If PIOs had not established networks with
other communication officers prior to the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, they reported
wanting to establish networks before the next emergency occurs. The following section
describes institutionalized processes that were formed as PIOs worked with nationallybased external partners.
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Institutionalized processes when working with national external partners.
Based on participants’ stories and examples generated from interview data, PIOs
consistently cited their respective state health department, CDC and the National Public
Health Coalition (NPHIC) as constant sources of information during the outbreak. PIOs’
partnerships with their state health department, CDC and NPHIC are all based on social
interactions that occurred over time. While the state provided guidance to LPHD, CDC
and NPHIC provided PIOs with other kinds of information: internal, or non-public,
information about how the federal government and other states were responding to the
outbreak. PIOs appreciated hearing what CDC and other states were doing to respond to
H1N1. This section reveals the institutionalized processes that were used as PIOs worked
with nationally-based external partners. Janet, a California based PIO, explains that CDC
was also a great resource: “The CDC had established a great website early on, with basic
information, updates, fact sheets, etc. This was invaluable. We regularly linked to this
page from our website.”
PIOs not only cited the CDC with providing information and emergency risk
communication messages, but NPHIC was also a reliable resource. NPHIC is
membership based organization for PIOs, but often health departments require PIOs to be
a member due to grant funding. As a result, being a member of NPHIC is an
institutionalized process for PIOs whose health department dictates their membership.
Richard, a California PIO, explained the role of NPHIC in providing information to PIOs
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak.
So NPHIC was key and, obviously, as part of that the Centers for Disease Control
that’s really where the information was coming from, but NPHIC was really a
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rapid fire distribution mechanism for coordinating conference calls and keeping
us on top of all the developments just as soon as the information was known.
Richard highlights how these external national partnerships provided PIOs with
up-to-date information about the evolving outbreak. Many of the interviewees from NJ
also credited NPHIC and CDC with providing local health departments with information
about the outbreak. Angela, who has worked for a regional health commission in New
Jersey for the past six years, mentioned how she was able to capitalize on the working
relationships with CDC and other federal agencies when disseminating information to
others:
We utilized things that the state and the CDC and the Feds had available like
panflu.gov. We definitely disseminated those through our local health
departments and hospitals as best that we could. Our role here at Marietta
Regional is always to be a resource and rather than reinvent the wheel if
somebody’s got something there already we’ll just help get it out there.

Angela comment’s reveal that she trusts CDC as a source of credible information
and works to make sure that information is then shared with her local community
stakeholders. Her dependence on CDC is institutionalized process because CDC, as a
federal agency, is the lead agency for the emergency response. She relies upon the federal
government to provide her with accurate and up-to-date information on the evolving
situation before her local media learns about it. Angela is also a NPHIC member and has
a direct link to CDC because of that membership.
Overall, PIOs reported positive experiences in working with both internal and
external partners, but there were a few challenges. Janet, who primarily works as a health
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program manager for a single county health department in California, wrote the following
in email communication to the author (respondent emphasis):
One of the BIGGEST challenges, in my opinion, was that the CDC (particularly
early on) was so dire in their communication to the public. While this did get
people's attention, and motivated people to take precautions, it did create a bit of a
panic among some people in the community, and I do believe that there is now
somewhat of a backlash and skepticism among the public and media because
things never got that bad.
Here Janet focuses on CDC’s emergency risk communication messages and how, as the
lead agency was responding on a national level, those national messages impacted how
LPHD responded to local inquiries about the ongoing outbreak. Janet mentioned another
issue with national partners; they wouldn’t give LPHDs notice about messages or
information CDC was going to be releasing:
If the CDC had given us more notice, we could have been better prepared. During
the H1N1 response, particularly during the first month or so, there were many
telephone conference calls with the state and CDC, and a flurry of emails from
these and other organizations. In fact, in my opinion, there were TOO many
different teleconference calls and emails.
Janet’s comments reveal the overload of information was CDC became
detrimental to her ability to conduct emergency risk communication efforts. She felt she
that participating in conference calls with the CDC would impact her local efforts, and
she chose not to participate. Here Joan reveals that although an institutionalized process
was in place, she chose not to enact that social structure.
PIOs came to trust that CDC would provide them with insider or non-public
information. However, PIOs cited some inconsistencies in CDC’s insider messages to
LPHD. Sandra, a PIO from a rural health department in North Dakota, also remembered
feeling frustrated with CDC’s mechanism for providing internal information to PIOs:
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You know I would say my one frustration and as a public information officer that
I found frustrating was the lack of information coming from CDC to the public
information officers on the local level about what they were going to be putting
out to the public. I know I belong to NPHIC and we got an email one day saying
‘Nope, the CDC’s not going to release this until Monday,’ and I don’t even
remember what it was…. The next day and I went home and read my MSN and
they had released it. It had local impact and I had local media calling me at home
and if I hadn’t have went home and read that on MSN I wouldn’t have know why
they were calling me. We didn’t get anything from the CDC about public
information until the public was getting it.
PIOs assumed they would be among the first to know if CDC was doing something that
would impact their local response to H1N1; however, here Sandra reveals that CDC was
inconsistent with provide that internal information. While sharing information during the
early stages of an emergency is vital, the information ought to be helpful for PIOs when
creating localized messages.
Since CDC is often designated as the lead response agency for public health
emergencies for federal government, the agency deals with the complexities of handling
dual roles. CDC must first act as a responding agency and gather situational awareness
about the event and that share that information key stakeholders. However, CDC provides
guidance to state and local health departments. As a result, CDC’s response functions,
such as dissemination information on a national platform, impacted the response of
LPHD. In conclusion, this section highlighted PIO working partnerships with both
internal and external entities. The partnerships proved helpful for PIOs disseminating
information to the public about the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak; however, there were some
challenges with the external, national partners.
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Summary
Key findings associated with research question three are amplified by a microlevel within-state analysis. Prior to and during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, PIOs and
LPHDs developed working relationships with public health staff, locally-based first
responder organizations, and nationally-based organizations. These working relationships
form the following three categories respectively: local internal partnerships, local
external partnerships, and national external partnerships. This summary will compares
and contrasts the key finding across the four state included in this study.
PIOs local internal relationships with public health staff were inconsistent across
the four states. The creation of these partnerships prior to or during the outbreak was
often linked to institutionalized practices of that LPHD. For example, health departments
that responded to many previous emergencies and incidents there was a greater emphasis
on including PIOs in emergency preparedness and response activities.
For those LPHDs that had less experience, often times public information was
distinctly separate from planning and response activities. This study suggests this lack of
PIO involvement in planning activities could have occurred for a few different reasons.
First, the emergency plan writer could simply be focused on completing the assigned
task. The task-oriented nature of emergency preparedness and response activities
sometimes unintentional silos individuals. Second, the emergency designated PIO may
have no communication training or expertise in emergency risk communication and opted
not to participate in emergency planning. Third, the relationship between the planner and
the PIO may not exist because of a combination of the previous two reasons. If the PIO is
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not involved in any planning activities, the notion of separating emergency preparedness
from public information becomes an institutionalized practice. In turn, these
institutionalized processes can—for better or worse—dictate the working partnerships
between the PIO and other public health staff. Boundary spanning literature explains that
organizational members with many internal working relationships are likely to be more
influential in internal decision-making. If PIOs do not have many internal working
relationships they are likely to be less influential within their own health department.
In addition to PIOs’ relationships with public health staff, working partnerships
with locally-based first responder organizations were often created through
institutionalized processes of NIMS and ICS. Often locally-based external partnerships
were formed based upon institutionalized processes generated by NIMS and ICS. For
local external partners, PIOs consistently named the same working partners; they also
cited K-12 educational institutions, hospitals and private providers most frequently.
Some Kentucky PIOs reported “turf issues” with educational institutions in their
community, but this is likely due to a lack of emergency planning with them prior to the
2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. In addition to working with traditional first responder
organizations, many PIOs cited the benefits of working directly with communication
officers from those organizations. The PIOs who were involved in PIO-specific coalitions
reported many benefits associated with this particular partnership including the extended
reach of the message and overall consistency in the messages. Even PIOs who reported
informally worked with other PIOs, such as calling to inform them of new information or
coordinating media efforts, also discussed the benefits of such a relationship.
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The third and final category focused on nationally-based external relationships.
PIOs in all four states were consistent in naming the CDC and NPHIC as nationallybased external partners. The relationships with the CDC and NPHIC were beneficial to
PIOs in providing needed information during the outbreak. The institutionalized
processes that lead to the formation of these relationships often depends on PIOs previous
involvement with these organizations. For example, in North Dakota and New Jersey, all
PIOs belong to NPHIC. This institutionalized process was formed because PIOs at both
state health departments were actively involved with NPHIC and encouraged all PIOs to
join the organization. However, for PIOs in Kentucky and California, their participation
varied. Most notably, many Kentucky PIOs were not members of NPHIC and had never
heard of the organization before the author mentioned it during the phone interview.
In conclusion, this chapter provided the results and analysis of interview data
related to the three primary questions posed by this dissertation study. This chapter
explicitly answered the three research questions using a general macro approach as well
as specific micro-level within-state analyses. The next chapter will highlight the study’s
implications, limitations, future directions and overall conclusions.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Implications
The purpose of this study was to better understand structures, roles and
relationships that were present during local public health’s emergency response to the
2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. More specifically, this study analyzed how organizational
structures facilitated and constrained emergency risk communication, how the role of a
PIO is enacted similarly or differently in the four states included in this study, and the
types of relationships that PIOs developed and maintained during the 2009-2010 H1N1
outbreak. An interpretative analysis of interview data with individuals who served as the
emergency response PIO during the 2009-2010 H1N1 in four states was conducted.
Structuration theory and, specifically, the theoretical concepts of duality of structure,
agent, and institutionalized processes were used to develop the interview guide and frame
the subsequent analytical inductive data analysis process (Patton, 2002).
This study explores the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak retrospectively, analyzing the
work of PIOs before and during a national public health emergency. Other
communication studies focusing on PIOs have studied the structures surrounding the role
of PIOs. Instead previous research focused on how PIOs frame messages and disseminate
emergency information (Avery & Kim, 2009; Avery, Lariscy & Sohn, 2009).
This study sought to add knowledge to the risk and crisis communication literature by
viewing PIOs from the perspective of organizational structures. This study also has
findings relevant to previous risk communication best practices research (Seeger, 2005;
Sellnow & Vidoloff, 2008; Vidoloff & Petrun, 2010).
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The following sections provide implications of this study’s research based on the
study’s findings outlined in Chapter Four. After the conclusions and implications are
stated, limitations and future direction are discussed, followed the study’s overall
conclusion. The conclusions and implications are organized according to the three
research questions pursued in this study.
Research Question One: What are the implicit and explicit structures that constrain
and facilitate emergency risk communication produced by public health PIOs
during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak?
This study revealed that organizational structures can and do constrain emergency
risk communication efforts. The structures that constrain how PIOs conduct emergency
planning and response activities are often dictated by policies and procedures that are
established without the input of the PIO. For this study, organizational structures that
constrain emergency risk communication are emergency response plans and the
emergency response structures of NIMS and ICS.
Previous best practices research in risk and crisis communication advocates that
practitioners continuously update and evaluation emergency response plans, but it does
not explicitly state who should write, update and maintain plans (Seeger, 2005). Further,
best practice research fails to offer any specific recommendations related the construction
of the emergency response plans. For example, current best practice research fails to
explain what types of materials are most helpful to emergency responders and,
specifically, PIOs during an emergency response. This study provides evidence that PIOs
with plans that included SOPS, pre-developed materials and contact lists were able to
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effectively apply those plans during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. Having the predeveloped materials provided PIOs the opportunity to update materials and quickly create
emergency messages. This study also provides evidence suggesting that PIOs should
serve as communication advisors during the emergency planning process. Specifying this
role extends and clarifies current best practice research related to emergency plan
development and evaluation. PIOs often have a vast wealth of knowledge about message
creation, dissemination, audience segmentation and media relations. They should have
the opportunity to share that knowledge with emergency planners as they create plans
that PIOs must follow during an emergency response.
Although structuration theory has been used in a variety of settings, it had yet to
be applied in an emergency context. Previous structuration theory research focused on
organizational group decision making, the ontology of the theory, and relationship
building (Banks & Riley, 1993; Bastein, McPhee & Bolton, 1995; Conrad, 1993; Garner,
2006; Howard & Geist, 1995; McPhee & Seibold, 1985; Nicotera, 2008; Poole, McPhee
& Seibold, 1982; Witmer, 1997). Through the application of structuration theory to a
crisis context, this study extends an understanding of the duality of structure and
specifically, the notion of permeability. The following paragraphs explain how this
study’s findings have implications for Giddens work related to permeability.
As previously mentioned, emergency response plans took the form of an
organizational structure that facilitated and constrained PIOs’ emergency risk
communication efforts. This study offers evidence to suggest that basic plans, which
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include pre-developed templates and other communication materials, provide PIOs with
baseline information that can be adapted to different types of emergencies as needed.
The adaptability of these basic plans is what Giddens refers to as permeability or
looseness of organizational structures. As stated above, due to permeability, basic plans
facilitate emergency risk communication by providing PIOS with pre-developed plans,
policies and procedures that can be adapted for the evolving emergency. The lack of
permeability is exemplified in organizational structures that constrain emergency risk
communication (e.g., worst-case scenario plans, no plans and emergency response
structures of NIMS and ICS).
In contrast to basic plans, worst-case scenario plans do not provide PIOs with the
ability to adapt pre-developed materials to an evolving emergency. Worst-case scenario
plans lack permeability because they were created under strict emergency planning
assumptions—many of which did not hold true during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. As
a result, during the actual emergency response, PIOs were unable to use the predeveloped materials. In fact, they did not use the plan at all and focused on solely on
conducting media relation activities to the best of their ability—which often varied
considerably.
In addition to having basic plans or worst-case scenario plans, PIOs also reported
having no plans in place prior to the onset of the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak. The study
provides evidence to suggest that PIOs who did not have any form of emergency
response plan in place prior to the outbreak lacked a basic understanding of emergency
risk communication principles. Although CDC offers emergency risk communication
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training, many individuals designated to work as a PIO during an emergency are not
properly trained to handle that responsibility. Clearly those serving in the highly public
and media driven role of a PIO should receive proper training and have a certain level of
expertise in the area of media relations before being allowed to serve in that role during
an actual emergency.
This study also provides evidence suggesting that the emergency response
structures of NIMS and ICS—although designed to facilitate emergency risk
communication—in fact did not. Previous emergency response research often showcases
the benefits of using NIMS and ICS during emergencies to provide structures than enable
response agencies to be more effective (Annelli, 2005; Irwin, 2000; Lindell et al, 2005;
Lindell et al., 2007). However, there has been no communication research on how NIMS
and ICS constrain or facilitate the emergency risk communication process. This study is
the first of examine how the emergency response structures of NIMS and ICS constrain
emergency risk communication efforts. As discussed in Chapter One, the Joint
Information System is the mechanism to ensure information sharing and message fidelity
among other response agencies and the Joint Information Center (JIC) is the physical
structure where the PIO and other communication staff meet to facilitate information
flow (DHS, 2008). Government guidance suggests that PIOs should have standard
operating procedures for JIC personnel (DHS, 2007) and crisis communication literature
suggests creating these procedures during pre-crisis planning (Seeger et. al, 2003), but
there has been no evaluation of what happens once these structures are implemented.
While designed to be scalable structures, this study provides evidence that limited staff
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resources and a lack of familiarity with such emergency response structures constrained
the implementation of NIMS and ICS during the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak for the PIOs
surveyed. The findings for this study’s first research question have direct implication for
practitioners working in emergency response and public information. First, developing
basic emergency risk communication plans prior to an emergency is ideal. PIOs should
contact their state health, CDC, NPHIC or even a fellow PIO to obtain a copy of their
emergency response materials. CDC has numerous materials available online, at no cost,
that will benefit those who have not yet created a plan. For those who have already
developed plans, it is critical that the emergency response plans have permeability, so
they can be adapted to meet communication exigencies created by evolving emergencies.
Outlining information sharing and message disseminating processes, clearance and crossclearance processes prior to an emergency is also beneficial. Developing such processes
during the height of an emergency will constrain the flow of information. Second,
creating “living documents” ensures that pre-developed materials and response plans can
be adapted to evolving conditions rather than being solely depending upon the planning
assumptions that dictated its creation. It is not possible to develop all the materials that a
PIO might use during a response, but having pre-developed fact sheets, press release
templates, and other similar materials ensures that the PIO can begin to quickly develop
emergency risk communication messages. In particular, PIOs and HERCs from New
Jersey included these types of materials in their emergency plans and explained the
benefits of adapting pre-developed materials. Third, PIOs and other emergency response
staff should develop regular trainings to help non-emergency response staff become more
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familiar with NIMS and ICS. HSPD-5 required compliance at all levels of government
and “requires state and local adoption of NIMS as a condition for receiving federal
preparedness funds” (Jemison, 2005, p. 2; Lindell et al., 2007). Since NIMS and ICS
compliance is required in order to receive funding, emergency response staff should take
the lead ensuring that all staff members understand their emergency response role. This
study citing evidence stating that non-emergency staff’s unfamiliarity was one of the
main reasons why implementing a JIC and ICS was so difficult. Additionally, any
individuals responsible for the emergency risk communication should receive proper
training (e.g., CDC CERC training or the FEMA Advanced PIO course).
This section provided implications for research in the field of risk and crisis
communication that focused on how organizational structures impact emergency risk
communication. It explained how the study’s conclusions extend current literature and
provides practical implications for those working in the field of emergency response and
public information. The following section provides implications related to PIO research
in the area of risk and crisis communication.
Research Two Question: How do implicit and explicit structures impact the
enactment of the PIO role and are they different or similar depending upon the state
in which the individual is located?
Previous PIO research has not focused not how organizational structures relate to
the enactment of the PIO role. Instead, much PIO research has focused on how these
roles create and disseminate messages before and during emergency responses (Avery &
Kim, 2009; Avery et al., 2009; Andsager & Smiley, 1998; Stein, 2006; Dunwoody &
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Ryan, 1983; Telg & Raulerson, 1999). Additionally, as Chapter One revealed, federal
agencies continue to cite limitations related to emergency risk communication efforts,
specifically information coordinating and disseminating between and among response
organizations, which are often job responsibilities delegated to a PIO (TOPOFF 1, n.d.;
TOPOFF 2, n.d.; TOPOFF 3, n.d.). However, federal after action reports fail to provide
systematic evaluation of the role of the PIO during an exercise. National level exercises
continue to focus on the process of emergency risk communication, but they continue fail
to evaluate how the PIO role impacts this process (DHS, 2003; DHS, 2006; TOPOFF 1,
n.d.; TOPOFF 2, n.d.; TOPOFF 3, n.d.). While this previous research focused on federal
government agencies, this study provides evidence about the role of the PIO in local
public health departments.
The local government perspective (i.e., local public health departments) is
something that has been missing from previous research on public health emergency risk
communication (George, 2007; Hoffman & Norton, 2000; McNally, 2007; Office of
Inspector General, 2009). This study provides a unique perspective on how structures,
roles and relationships impact the PIO role in local public health departments. For
example, public health laws outline the state’s “police power” which gives local
government the ability to carry out duties related to protecting and promoting health and
ensuring the protection of individuals’ rights in the processes (Turnock, 2009, p. 164). As
a result, state health departments are able to develop public health systems most
appropriate for that state. Hence, there are striking differences in public health systems,
departments, laws, statues and ordinance across every state in the U.S. These differences
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in the overall organization of state and local health systems create differences in how the
PIO role is enacted across different states. This study provides evidence that the health
setting in New Jersey is very different than the health systems in other states, but
unfortunately, this study did not evaluate whether this differences in health systems
positively or negatively impacted how the PIO conducted emergency planning and
response activities, but rather identified what differences are present. Most notably,
individuals serving as communication officers in New Jersey are designated as HERCs—
Health Educator Risk Communicators. Since the New Jersey health system was
organized by bioterrorism funding after the 2001 anthrax attacks, HERCs only work on
emergency preparedness activities. Despite their intimate knowledge of the emergency
planning process and well-established community contacts, they are not utilized as the
emergency response PIO. In contrast, PIOs in California, New Jersey, and Kentucky, do
not have the HERC position. Instead, those PIOs either worked on both emergency
planning and response or only worked in emergency response.
In addition to the differences in how the explicit setting of health departments
impacted whether a PIO was involved in emergency planning and response activities,
social interactions, or implicit structures, with public health colleagues also impacted the
emergency planning and response activities a PIO performed. This study provides
evidence on how implicit structures such as social interactions between colleagues
actually resulted in similarities in PIO activities across the four states included in this
study. In accordance with previous research (Ankey and Curtin, 2002; Motschall & Cao,
2002; Stein, 2006; Surette, 1995; Ulmer, Avery & Kordsmeier, 2008), this study’s
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findings reveal that public health PIOs, regardless of geographic location, primarily
performed media relations activities during an emergency response. Regardless of where
the PIO was located (i.e., Kentucky, North Dakota, New Jersey or California), media
relations continues to be a primary responsibility for individuals serving as the
emergency response PIO. However, this research found new evidence that many PIOs
serve in multiple roles during an emergency response. For example, an individual may
primarily work in a non-communication role (e.g., as the health director, health educator,
training coordinator), but then are also designated to serve as the emergency response
PIO. Although this study did not evaluate the positive or negative impact of balancing
multiples role on the emergency risk communication process, it does provide evidence as
to the frustrations and challenges associated with the organizational expectation for one
individual to work in two—sometimes distinctly—different roles with no additional
compensation. The biggest challenge PIOs reported about serving in multiple roles was
the inability to adequately perform both positions. As a result, most PIOs said their
normal, day to day job suffered, but some did say they did not conduct emergency risk
communication activities to their fullest potential
The implications for practitioners working in emergency response and public
information is threefold. First, working in multiple roles is challenging and not likely to
change. This study revealed that many individuals serving the emergency response PIO
only, primarily serve in non-communication based roles on a daily basis. For example,
most notably in Kentucky, emergency response PIOs primarily serve as health directors,
emergency planners, health educators or training coordinators. Further, PIOs in the other
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three states also balanced multiple job responsibilities during the H1N1 outbreak. Many
faced the harsh realities of stopping work on their day to day responsibilities and focusing
only on PIO duties. Often times the daily work would not be completed because there
was no additional staff to assist with normal operations; this often cause the emergency
PIO to become overwhelmed. Cross-training, surge staff and volunteers are critical to
ensuring that those serving in the multidimensional PIO role have adequate assistance to
complete the job duties as needed. Second, this study overwhelming supports
communication training for those conducting emergency risk communication activities.
Additionally, since the PIO’s job duties could be altered based upon expectations
from other public health staff, department leadership and other emergency response
personnel should also receive emergency risk communication training. This not only
educates those individuals as to what the PIO role is and does, it also ensures crosstraining in case the lead PIO is unable to carry out his/her duties. Finally, this study has
limited findings related to how the setting of the health department impacts the PIO role.
While there clearly are differences among health departments, there is little PIOs can do
to change their health department’s structure.
This section revealed the implications for risk and crisis communication research
related to the PIO role. It explained how the study’s conclusions extend current literature
and provides practical implications for those working in the field of emergency response
and public information. The following section provides implications for organizational
communication and best practices in risk communication best practices.
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Research Question Three: In what ways are institutionalized processes related to
PIOs’ internal and external partnerships?
Previous research on organizational relationships has focused on how structuration theory
reveals how these relationships form and the influence such relationships have on
organizational processes (Garner, 2006). Additionally, best practice research advocates
for development of emergency response relationships prior to the onset of emergency
(Seeger, 2005; Sellnow & Vidoloff, 2008; Vidoloff & Petrun, 2010). NIMS and ICS
literature also offer recommendations on developing emergency response partnerships
(Jemison, 2005, p. 2; Lindell et al., 2007). A substantial amount of organizational
communication literature has examined how organizational members can have an impact
of the types of relationships that are formed both internal and external to the
organizational (Adams, 1979/1980; Aldrich & Hercker, 1977; Burk, 1994; Conrad, 1994;
Conway, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Jemison, 1984; Keller & Holland, 1975;
Tuite, 2006; Tushman, 1977). This previous literature has yet to examine relationship
building within the context of emergency planning and response activities.
This study provides findings on the types of relationships formed before and
during an emergency response. This study provides evidence of three types of
relationships that organizations can develop: internal relationships, external relationships
with locally-based response agencies and other community organizations, and external
relationships with professional associations and federal response agencies. Additionally,
it provides specific evidence suggesting that external relationships form due to multiple
previous interactions (e.g. during community-wide exercises and drills or tabletop
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discussions) related to emergency planning and response. Previous research on internal
relationships (Spence and Reddy, 2007; Tushman & Katz, 1980) reveals how
organizational members enacting the role of gatekeepers communicate internally between
different departments and divisions. This study supports that previous research, but also
reveals inconsistencies on who PIOs work with regarding emergency planning and
response activities. Some PIOs reported working with emergency preparedness staff,
epidemiologists, public health directors, health officers, immunization coordinators,
communicable disease control specialists, medical directors, clinical supervisors, nursing
staff, environmental health, home health, bioterrorism and training coordinators, but
again these relationships were not consistent across the four states included in this study.
This study provides evidence to suggest that health departments that have previous
emergency response experience included PIOs in emergency preparedness and response
activities. For those local public health departments that had less experience, often times
public information was distinctly separate from emergency planning and response
activities.
This study also supports previous research that suggests organizations develop
locally based external partnerships with other first responder and community-based
organizations prior to an emergency (Jemison, 2005, p. 2; Lindell et al., 2007; CDC,
2002; Seeger, 2005; Sellnow & Vidoloff, 2008; Vidoloff & Petrun, 2010). This study
also offers new evidence that PIOs should develop direct communication officer-tocommunication officer relationships. Although health departments may develop
relationships between health directors or emergency response planners, this study
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suggests that direct relationships between communication officers can extend the reach
and exposure of health department messages. Further, communication officers are well
versed in media relations activities, they can provide additional communication-specific
assistance to PIOs who may need help due to limited health department resources.
Finally, this study provides evidence suggesting that relationships between
professional organizations and federal response partners and PIOs is beneficial during the
response. This study supports previous research that organizational members can obtain
external information, filter that information and then provide new inputs to the
organization (Johnson and Chang, 2000; Maneve & Stevenson, 2001; Tushman &
Scanlan, 1981). During the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak, CDC and NPHIC disseminated
information to local PIOs. Albeit the flow of information from these organizations
became overwhelming for some, most PIOs reported the benefit of receiving such
information as the outbreak evolved over time. Unfortunately, those were not members of
NPHIC often did not obtain this information nor did they directly receive information
from CDC.
There are four implications for practitioners working in emergency response and
public information. First, practitioners need to develop internal working relationships
with their emergency response colleagues and any other internal departments that are
likely to assist with an emergency response. Developing these relationships occurs over
time, so multiple interactions such as regular staff meeting or specific emergency
planning activities help establish these relationships. Additionally, as PIOs develop more
internal contacts, the more influential that person will be within the organization. Second,
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in addition to establishing internal contacts, practitioners need to establish contacts with
other community organizations. NIMS provides guidance on the types of community
organizations that should be considered in emergency planning and response. Again,
these relationships also take time to form, so attending emergency planning activities
organized by other government agencies or community organizations is recommended.
Third, this study suggests that communication practitioners develop relationships with
other communication officers. Not only will the relationships extend the reach and
exposure of emergency messages, the additional networking is likely to yield trained
communicators who could assist with emergency communication activities as needed.
Fourth and finally, establishing relationships with federal response agencies and
professional organizations is critical. These organizations can provide communicators
with updated evolving emergency information before the media. They also provide
communication materials, pre-developed templates and other items that practitioners can
use to develop their basic emergency response plans.
The previous sections have outlined the theoretical implications for this research
on the field of risk and crisis communication, organizational communication, best
practices in risk and crisis communication. It also provides practical implications for
those working in the field of emergency response and public information. The following
sections provide limitations of the study’s findings as well as directions for future
research.
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Limitations
Using an interpretive design has inherent limitations related to the study’s sample
and findings. The generalizabilty of the study’s findings, the sampling strategy, data
collection efforts, and researcher presence are limitations of this study. These limitations
are further explained in the following sections.
Generalizabilty of findings.
The design of this study limits the generalizabilty of these findings beyond PIOs
included in this study. Although this study offers implications to the field of risk and
crisis communication and organizational communication, the findings are not
generalizable to the entire population of public health PIOs in the U.S. Additionally, the
study used only one source of data. Most qualitative researchers advocated for the use of
additional data sources in an effort to triangulate the study’s findings (Patton, 2002).
Unfortunately, this study did not incorporate additional data sources and the study’s
findings are based upon the stories and examples from those PIOs included in this study.
Again, this limits the generalizabilty of the findings beyond the population included in
this study. In addition to using an interpretative study design, the context of the
emergency does not yield generalizable results. Since emergencies vary on the type, the
magnitude of the harm or destruction, political ramifications, geographical location,
media attention findings from one emergency are not likely to be generalizable to other
types of emergencies. Further, the findings of the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic may not
hold true for future pandemic responses.
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Sampling strategy.
The sampling strategy used for this study yielded uneven representation of the
interviewees per state. For example, a majority of participants were from Kentucky,
California, New Jersey and North Dakota respectively. The number of participants from
each state varied greatly for the following reasons number of PIOs employed in the state,
convenience to the PIOs, and professional contacts. Additionally, this study included
more females than males. As a result, the study’s findings could have gender bias. For
example, women may interpret such actions or events different than their male
counterparts. Future research could analyze to see if gender differences exist between
male and female PIOs. As noted in Chapter Three, the field of public health and the role
of communication officers is often represented by more females than males. Of the 11
men included in the study, the author knew and worked with two of them. The remaining
nine, with the exception of one PIO in California, primarily served—not as the PIO—but
as the health director, the emergency preparedness coordinator, or the training
coordinator. Most of the men included in this study served only as the emergency
response PIO.
Data collection.
Data collection efforts are another limitation of this study. First, the interviews
took place over 10 months. This limits the study’s findings since recall bias is a factor
(Patton, 2002). PIOs’ memories were impacted by the length of time passed and the
information provided may not have been as in depth as it could have been. Second, the
length of time needed to conduct the interviews was an issue. North Dakota and
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Kentucky interviews were completed in early 2010 near the end of the 2009-2010 H1N1
outbreak. New Jersey and California interview data was not collected until the Fall 2010
after the author’s doctoral committee suggested two additional states be added to the
study’s sample. Adding the two additional states complicated the data collection process
in two ways.
First, by the time New Jersey and California were added to the study, the author
was more familiar and more comfortable with using the interview guide. As a result, the
first interviews collected at the beginning of the study are qualitatively different than
those interviews collected at the end of the study. As the author learned about PIOs’
experiences it the first two states, there was some overlap in the interviewees’ responses
in the remaining two states. As a result, the author felt more comfortable with probing
questions than she did at the beginning of the study. Second, due to external constraints
the author had a limited amount of time to collect data from PIOs in New Jersey and
California. As a result, saturation did not occur in California. Again, the study’s findings
are largely based upon the robustness of Kentucky interviews. Future research is needed
to conduct additional interviews in California.
Researcher presence.
Unlike quantitative studies, interpretative studies acknowledge the presence of the
researcher on the data collection and analysis processes in the study. During participant
recruitment, the author acknowledged that she worked as a PIO during the height of
pandemic planning activities. As a result, this information likely influenced individuals to
participate in the study. Additionally, in an effort to build rapport with the interviewees,
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the author often remarked on her work in public health as a PIO. Again, this information
likely influenced how the PIOs responded to the interview questions. Additionally,
interpretative research is often dependent upon the skills of researcher and is often
influenced by the researcher’s biases. Although the author conducted or assisted with
other qualitative projects, the author’s skills and personal biases are likely to have
influenced the study’s findings.
This section has described the limitations of this study. The next section describes
future directions for research in the area of risk and crisis communication specifically
related to PIOs and emergency response.
Future Directions
Given the previous limitations, several avenues for future research exist such as
evaluating NIMS and ICS structures, conducting additional interviews with PIOs in
California and other states, recruiting more males to explore gender differences, and
pursing four quantitative research studies in an effort to generalize findings beyond a
small group of individuals. First, this study has been foundational in analyzing the
structures, roles and relationships of PIOs in emergency planning and response. While
this study provided an exploratory analysis of the emergency response structures of
NIMS and ICS, additional evaluation research is needed. NIMS and ICS were originally
designed during the 1970s for firefighters engaged in responding to wildfires. There has
been limited research on the implementation and adaptability of these structures to a
public health emergency response (George, 2007). While lack of familiarity of NIMS and
ICS were often cited as the reason why these structures constrained emergency risk
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communication efforts, it is unclear if the unfamiliarity is due to the foundation of the
structures coming from a non-public health field or a lack of training within the health
department. Future research is needed to evaluate the use of NIMS and ICS within the
public health field.
A majority of the participants were based in Kentucky and many of the findings in
the study are based upon more available data from those PIOs. Future research could
conduct additional interviews in California, which serves millions of community
members. Speaking with only 11 PIOs in the northern and middle portions of the state
excludes the PIOs found in the southern part of the state. Due to the vast area the state
covers, it is likely that PIOs in southern California experienced during the 2009-2010
H1N1 outbreak are very differently than PIOs’ experiences in the middle and northern
parts of the state—especially given the first two confirmed cases of H1N1 occurred in
San Diego, CA. In addition to California, interviewing PIOs in other states and
conducting multiple case studies would yield findings relevant to the field of risk and
crisis communication. For example, some states in the U.S. reported greater numbers of
cases than other states in the U.S. It is likely that states with higher confirmed cases had
greater communication exigencies during the outbreak. As such, conducting a nested case
study design could reveal interesting findings related to how PIOs in states hardest hit by
the 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak enacted emergency risk communication efforts.
In addition to conducting case study research, one additional qualitative study
could focus on gender differences between male and female PIOs. For this study, the
participants were overwhelmingly female. Although public health and health
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communication officers are primarily populated by females, it is possible that gender
differences exist. For example, emergency response is often male dominated, so males
serving in an emergency response PIO role could have had vastly different experiences
than female PIOs who serve in that role on a daily basis. This study did not consider
gender differences, but future research could reveal some interesting findings on how
gender impacts the enactment of the PIO role.
As previously stated, this dissertation was a foundational study focused on
structures, roles and relationships related to how PIOs conduct emergency risk
communication. Due to the study’s interpretative nature, the generalizabilty of the study’s
findings are limited. The author suggests four quantitative studies related to role impact
on emergency risk communication message outcome, PIO relationships on message
outcome, and the impact of an individual’s experience and education on the PIO role. The
following paragraphs provide more detail on this future studies.
First, this study provides evidence of how organizational structures and the
context of the emergency facilitated and constrained emergency risk communication
efforts, but it did not analyze if the PIO serving in more than one emergency personnel
role negatively or positively impacted emergency risk communication efforts. Future
research could analyze to see if the message outcome (i.e., messages disseminated to the
public) was impacted by an individual serving in two full time roles. This study revealed
that PIOs reported they did not have enough time to fully carryout the role of a PIO, but
being able to quantify that finding would provide additional evidence to suggest that
PIOs serving in multiple roles during emergency response is detrimental to emergency
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risk communication efforts. Another component of a study looking at relationships
between role and message outcome could analyze how PIOs’ involvement in emergency
planning and response impacts message outcome. For example, a factorial design (e.g.,
analyzing Role X Involvement X Message Outcome) could analyze the impact these
variables have on emergency risk communication efforts.
Second, in addition to quantifying the PIO role and message outcome, future
research could also look at the working relationships developed by PIOs. This study
revealed that many of the emergency response relationships were developed based on
previous interactions during emergency exercises. A longitudinal study could analyze
two emergency response agencies to better understand how emergency planning and
response partnerships form over time. For example, does the frequency of interaction
determine the strength of the relationship? Additionally, for agencies that are not often
involved in emergency planning and response, like educational institutions and long-term
care organizations, how does the absence of previous relationships impact the emergence
of an emergency response relationship?
Third, this study revealed the benefits of direct communication officer-tocommunication officer working relationships. In an effort to better understand how
relationships between communication officers impacts emergency risk communication
efforts, a network analysis of public health PIOs could be conducted. Network analysis
allows researchers to visualize the networks between individuals and to assess the
strength of those relationships. A network analysis could reveal new findings about how
communication officer-to-communication officer relationships positively or negatively
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impact overall emergency risk communication efforts. Fourth and finally, this study
revealed similarities and differences of the enactment of the PIO role across four different
states. Individuals that enacted the role of the PIO had varying degrees of professional
experience, but this study did not specifically analyze how the amount of professional
experience or educational background impacts the enactment of the PIO role. Future
research studies examining educational status and professional experience could lead to
the development of core competencies for communication officers serving in the PIO
role.
This section outlined directions for future research related conducting additional
interviews with PIOs in California and other states, recruiting more males to explore
gender differences, and pursuing four quantitative research studies in an effort to
generalize some findings beyond a small group of individuals. The following section
offers the overall conclusions for this doctoral dissertation.
Overall Conclusion
Communication officers, at all levels of government, will continue to serve their
community’s and agency’s needs during times of crisis. Structuration theory provided a
theoretical framework to understand the implicit and explicit structures that facilitate and
constrain emergency risk communication efforts. As organizational structures, both
socially and physically constructed, guide emergency planning activities, they
simultaneously determine the outcome of those activities. During the emergency planning
process, organizations need to be mindful of the impact planning assumptions have on the
construction of emergency response structures and develop plans with permeability to
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ensure adaptability during the response. Social scientists, practitioners, subject matter
experts, government officials, NGO’s, and the private sector need to continue to develop
and maintain working relationships prior to and during emergencies. No one agency can
adequately respond to a emergency and coordinating emergency response efforts prior to
an event occurring are likely to yield a more organized response than not. Emergency
response agencies often develop working relationships through participation in
community-based and statewide emergency exercises. These continued social
interactions play a role in institutionalizing the partnerships over time.
While each agency involved in the response are likely to have competing interests
and communication agendas, the foremost issue to be communicating emergency risk
communication that can mitigate harm and ultimately protect human health and safety.
As threats emerge and the severity of emergencies increase, government agencies, as
designated leads for emergency response, need to be adequately prepared to respond
while providing timely, accurate and consistent information to stakeholders.
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Appendix A
Analyzing the role of Public Information Officers during an Influenza Pandemic
Phone Interview Guide
1. Main question: As a public information officer, describe your involvement in pandemic influenza
planning.
a. If you are not involved now, is this type of planning something that you would be interested in
being more involved with in the future? Would you feel comfortable asking to be involved? Why
or why not?
2. Main question: Can you describe your interactions with pandemic influenza planners, emergency
preparedness planners, and others (health director, health officer, epidemiologist) involved in emergency
response?
a. Probing: Who do you speak with most often? Is this on a daily basis?
b. Probing: Who do you speak with less frequently, but are important to the planning process? Can
you tell me a story about a recent conversation?
3. Main question: Describe your involvement in writing a crisis communication plan.
a. Probing: Is there a separate plan for communicating about pandemic influenza?
b. Probing: Do you have involvement in writing the Emergency Operations Plan
(EOP)?
c. Probing: What is the involvement of other public information officers (from other agenciesfire/police/emergency management) in your communication planning to an influenza pandemic?
4. Main question: Can you describe the last time you were involved in the revision process of the crisis
communication plan?
a. Probing: What went well? What didn’t? Were there any events/unplanned
consequences related to its revision?
b. Probing: How often is the plan tested and revised?
c. Probing: How are changes approved (does someone, perhaps the Health Director need to
approve changes?)
5. Main question: How have you prepared to provide crisis information regarding a pandemic influenza
today? Do you feel adequately prepared? Why or why not?
a. Probing: If yes, what things have you done (or organization has done) to help you be prepared?
b. Probing: If not prepared, what would you like to see change to help you prepare?
6. Main question: Can you describe how your pandemic influenza planning influence how your department
handled its H1N1 response? What role did you have in the process? What constrained the response? What
worked/didn’t?
a. Probing: Can you imagine a conflict that occurred in the planning (or response)
process? How was the conflict resolved? Who were the players?
b. Probing: Were there ambiguities (unsure of your role in planning or response) you encountered
in reacting to H1N1? How were they handled?
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Appendix B
Analyzing the role of Public Information Officers during an Influenza Pandemic:
Participant Recruitment Materials
Recruitment Information: Email
Dear (insert name here),
I received your name from (XXXXXX). I am a doctoral student at the University of Kentucky studying the
role of public health public information officers during a pandemic influenza. I am working under the
direction of _________________.
I would like to speak with the individuals who were involved in the disseminating public information
during the pandemic. Speaking with these individuals will provide more information regarding the role of
the PIO’s during a pandemic.
Please let me know if you are interested in participating in this study, and when you are available during
the first or second week of March for an interview.
Thank you,
Kathleen Vidoloff, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate, University of Kentucky
Follow up email
Dear (insert name here),
I have yet to hear back from you regarding my previous email sent on (insert date). I am following up to
see are interested in participating in this study, and when you are available during the first or second week
of (XXXXX) for an interview.
I received your name from the (XXXXXXX). I am a doctoral student at the University of
Kentucky studying the role of public health public information officers during a pandemic influenza. I am
working under the direction of ________________.
I would like to speak with the individuals who were involved in the disseminating public information
during the pandemic. Speaking with these individuals will provide more information regarding the role of
the PIO’s during a pandemic.
I look forward to hearing back from you,
Kathleen Vidoloff, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate, University of Kentucky
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from New Zealand’s Operation Waiheke.” National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, Fargo, ND, April 13, 2007.
Vidoloff, K.G. Illustrating the Best Practices: A Case Study of the Foot and Mouth Hoax
Outbreak in New Zealand. National Communication Association, San Antonio,
TX, November 15-19, 2006.
Vidoloff, K.G. Learning about hoax terrorist threats from New Zealand’s ‘Operation
Waiheke’. National Center for Food Protection and Defense Team Meeting,
Washington, DC, October 19 -20, 2006.
Vidoloff, K.G. Illustrating the Best Practices in Risk and Crisis Communication: New
Zealand’s Response to a Foot and Mouth Disease Hoax. Red River Applied
Communication Student Conference, Fargo, ND May 2 – 3, 2006.
Sellnow, T.L., & Vidoloff, K.G. Charting the course: Establishing ten best practices for
risk and crisis communication. Central States Communication Association,
Indianapolis, IN, April 5-9, 2006.
“Tabletop Exercise for Pandemic Influenza.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Regional Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Training, New
York, NY October 10-12, 2006.
“Tabletop Exercise for Pandemic Influenza.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Regional Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Training, Boston,
MA, October 2 -4, 2006.
“Tabletop Exercise for Pandemic Influenza.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Regional Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Training, Atlanta,
GA, September 20-22, 2006.

POSTER PRESENTATIONS
Vidoloff, K.G., Petrun, E.L., Sellnow, T.L. (2010, September). Media analysis of the 2008
Salmonella saintpaul outbreak: Implications for food safety and food defense plans.
Poster Session at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Annual
Meeting, Chaska, MN.
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Vidoloff, K.G. Organizations, public information officers and pandemic influenza: A
proposal to study information demands through the lens of Structuration Theory.
(2010, February). Poster session presented at the 32nd Annual Research Symposium
College of Communication and Information, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
TN.
Veil, S., Sellnow, T. L., Venette, S., & Vidoloff, K.G. (2008, November). Using the Best
Practices in Risk Communication as an evaluation tool. Poster session presented
at the National Communication Association, San Diego, CA.
Sellnow, T. L., Petrun, E., Vidoloff, K. G. (2008, September). Confounding Issues for
Implementing Best Practices in Risk Communication. Poster session presented at
the annual meeting of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Chaska,
MN.
Vidoloff, K. G., & Sellnow, T. L. (2008, September). Risk Communication Strategies Used
to Respond to the 2005 New Zealand FMD Hoax. Poster session presented at the
annual meeting of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Chaska,
MN.
Vidoloff, K. G., & Sellnow, T. L. (2008, November). The convergence of interacting
arguments in risk communication: The inherent communication challenge of
terrorist hoaxes. Poster session presented at the National Communication
Association, San Diego, CA.
Vidoloff, K. G., & Sellnow, T. L. (2008, July). Risk Communication Strategies Used to
Respond to the 2005 New Zealand FMD Hoax. Poster session presented at the
Natural Hazards Workshop, Broomfield, CO.
Veil, S. & Vidoloff, K.G. (2005, November). 10 Best Practices in Risk Communication.
Poster session presented at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense
Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA.

PROFESSIONAL PROJECTS
Collaborative project in 2008 with the City of Fargo, ND; Fargo Cass Public Health; MinnKota Chapter, American Red Cross; and other community organizations to edit and update
the Cass and Clay County emergency guide, “Are You Prepared?” The project was
supported by grant/cooperative agreement number 5U90TP817000 from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
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Collaborative project in 2007 with Healthy Roads Media and Fargo Cass Public Health to
create emergency preparedness materials in multiple languages and multiple formats. The
finished products are available http://www.healthyroadsmedia.org/topics/emergencies.htm.
Collaborative project in 2007 with NCFPD and NDSU to create a risk and crisis
communication booklet for public health officials. The finished product is available
online at http://risk-crisis.ndsu.nodak.edu/projects.html.

SERVICE
Colloquium Series on Health Literacy, College of Communications and
Information Studies, University of Kentucky · Fall 2010
• Planning assistant
American Meteorological Society (AMS) · Fall 2010
• Conference planning assistant
• Media training specialist
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency Communications
System Embedment Project · July 25-28, 2010
• Research participant
Journal of Applied Communication Research · July 2010
• Reviewer
National Communication Association · Spring 2009
• Applied Division Reviewer
• Student Division Reviewer
Kentucky Conference on Health Communication · Winter 2009
• Reviewer
Guest Lecturer, University of Kentucky Dept. of Communication · Fall 2009
• Marketing Public Relations ICS 341
National Communication Association · Fall 2009
• Registration Volunteer
National Communication Association Preconference · Fall 2009
• Preconference Planning Assistant
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Extension Disaster Education Network Food Protection Conference
Preconference · Summer/Fall 2009
• Planning Assistant and Risk Communication Session Moderator
University of Kentucky Dept. of Communication Graduate Student Association ·
Spring 2009
• Event Planner: Job Talk Presentation
National Communication Association · March 2008/2009
• Student Reviewer
Central States Communication Association · September 2008
• Student Reviewer
Journal of Applied Communication Research · June 2005 – November 2008
• Editorial Assistant
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency Communications
System Embedment Project · September 19 – 21, 2007
• Participant
NDSU Academic Affairs Committee · September 2006 – December 2006
• Graduate Student Representative
Central States Communication Association · October 2005 – April 2006
• Conference Planning Assistant

Signed: Kathleen G. Vidoloff
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